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Consider the following disclosure problem. The government indicts
a defendant on an armed robbery charge arising from a violent mugging.
The prosecution's case is based entirely on the testimony of the victim,
who identified the defendant from police photographs of persons with a
record of similar violent crime. With only the victim's testimony to rely
on, the prosecutor is unsure of her ability to obtain a conviction at trial.
She offers the defendant a guilty plea limiting his sentencing exposure to
five years, a significant concession in light of the defendant's substantial
prior record and the fact that the charged offense carries a maximum
penalty of fifteen years incarceration. As trial nears, the victim's confi-
dence in the identification appears to wane. The robbery took place at
night. He was frightened and saw his assailant for a matter of seconds.
The victim refuses to talk to the defense, but confides to the prosecutor
his fear of a mistake in the photo identification. He is now unsure if the
man he picked from the police photographs is the man who robbed him.
On the eve of trial, the defendant responds to the prosecutor's plea offer.
He indicates that he is willing to plead guilty if the prosecutor will limit
the sentence to one year. Is the prosecutor free to accept a guilty plea
without disclosing the victim's statement of uncertainty about the
identification?
The prosecutor who tries a criminal case is bound by a constitu-
tional and ethical duty of disclosure. The seminal constitutional case,
Brady v. Maryland, I articulates a rule grounded in due process mandat-
ing disclosure of material evidence favorable to the defendant. The past
twenty-six years have seen the Brady rule established as a familiar feature
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1. 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
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of constitutional criminal procedure. It is cited in hundreds of opinions,
routinely invoked in criminal trial courts, treated in virtually every mod-
em criminal procedure text, and echoed in the ethical mandates of the
prosecutor's office.2 C--e would think that during its twenty-six year his-
tory the question of the Brady rule's application to cases in which guilt is
determined by guilty plea-the vast majority of federal and state criminal
cases3-would have been resolved. Despite widespread familiarity with
the Brady rule, however, the prosecutor's disclosure obligation in situa-
tions such as the one posed in the introductory hypothetical remains un-
certain. The constitutional, ethical, and statutory requirements for such
disclosure are largely unresolved.
This ambiguity in the rules of plea bargaining is striking. The fre-
quency with which leading scholars in criminal procedure and ethics
raise the question of prosecutorial disclosure in the guilty plea process
indicates the issue's provocative nature.4 Yet few have attempted to ana-
lyze or answer the question of disclosure of Brady material in the guilty
plea process. 5 The fact that the guilty plea is the primary means for
resolving criminal cases suggests the importance of the issue. One might
conclude that Brady disclosure in the guilty plea context is at least as
important as in the trial context because of the much greater frequency
of guilty pleas. Examination of the dynamics of plea bargaining reveals
2. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8(d) (1983); MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(B) (1980). The full text of these rules is
set forth infra note 206.
3. The United States Supreme Court has estimated that "well over three-fourths of the
criminal convictions in this country rest on pleas of guilty." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
742, 752 (1970). An analysis of the use of guilty pleas in 14 jurisdictions throughout the
United States published in 1987 revealed that "[t]he median ratio of pleas to trials among these
14 jurisdictions is 11 pleas for every trial." BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, THE PREVALENCE OF GUILTY PLEAS 2 (1987) [hereinafter JUSTICE DEP'T STATIS-
TICS]. A recently published study of felonies in nine county court systems in Illinois, Michi-
gan, and Pennsylvania found that "[c]ontested trials account for less than 8 percent of all
dispositions, whereas guilty pleas and diversions together account for more than 81 percent of
all dispositions and 93 percent of all convictions." P. NARDULLI, J. EISENSTEIN & R. FLEM-
ING, THE TENOR OF JUSTICE 203 (1988).
4. See, e.g., G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS: ETHICS AND
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 352 (1981); Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, MOD-
ERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: CASES, COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS 1221-22 (6th ed. 1986); A.
KAUFMAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 397 (3d ed. 1989); T. MORGAN &
R. ROTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 269 (4th ed.
1987); S. SALTZBURG, AMERICAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES AND COMMENTARY 774
n.34 (3d ed. 1988).
5. The phrase "Brady material" is used in this Article as a shorthand term for evidence
that would qualify for disclosure pursuant to the Brady rule under current Supreme Court
doctrine if the case were tried. The phrase "Brady cases" is used as a shorthand term for cases
in which Brady material exists.
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40
DISCLOSURE IN THE GUILTY PLEA PROCESS
that Brady disclosure in the guilty plea context is more significant than
even the figures on the frequency of guilty pleas suggest. As the analysis
set forth in section II(B) indicates, the dynamics of the plea negotiation
process tend to direct prosecuted cases posing Brady disclosure questions
away from trial and into the guilty plea process for resolution. In fact,
the more exculpatory the information, the greater the pressure toward
resolving the case by guilty plea rather than by trial.
This Article advocates mandatory disclosure of Brady material to
criminal defendants who plead guilty. Although the primary focus is on
the constitutional dimension of disclosure, the Article also makes a case
that ethical and statutory rules should require the disclosure of Brady
material in the guilty plea process. Section I reviews the origins and sig-
nificance of the Brady rule as well as the importance of examining the
accuracy implications of disclosure in plea negotiations. Section II main-
tains that Brady disclosure would enhance the factual accuracy 6 of guilty
pleas. Such disclosure would reinforce the reliability of confessions un-
derlying guilty pleas7 by enhancing two distinct factors on which that
reliability depends: the knowledge and the sincerity of the defendant.8
First, Brady disclosure will enhance the reliability of confessions when
the defendant literally does not know facts critical to his own criminal
liability. The force of this claim is clearly limited to Brady cases present-
ing defects in the defendant's knowledge. Second, and more generally,
Brady disclosure will help safeguard the defendant's sincerity in confess-
ing by providing a check on the considerable pressure to plead guilty,
regardless of guilt or innocence, that tends to be generated in the plea
negotiation of Brady cases. The force of this claim is broader than the
first claim since it extends to all prosecuted Brady cases. An economic
model of plea bargaining utilized by Judge Frank Easterbrook illustrates
the corrosive influence that a Brady disclosure rule restricted to trial
6. By "factual accuracy" I mean an accurate determination of the questions of historical
fact necessary to determine whether or not the elements required by the definition of the
charged offense and any applicable defenses have been fulfilled.
7. "Central to the [guilty] plea and the foundation for entering judgment against the
defendant is the defendant's admission in open court that he committed the acts charged in the
indictment." Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. at 748. The accuracy of a guilty plea is not
dependent on the defendant's confession in the unusual situation of an "Alford plea." In such
cases, the defendant entering a plea of guilty refuses to admit guilt and the government pro-
vides the factual basis for the plea. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 28, 38 n.10
(1970).
8. The reliability of a statement is a function of its clarity and the defendant's percep-
tion, memory, and sincerity. See Saltzburg, A Special Aspect of Relevance: Countering Nega-
tive Inferences Associated with the Absence of Evidence, 66 CALIF. L. RFv. 1011, 1034 (1978);
Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L. Rnv. 957, 958-59 (1974). "Knowledge" in this
Article encompasses both perception and memory.
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would have on the accuracy of the results of plea negotiations. In section
III the Article proposes due process, ethical, and statutory approaches to
implementing the Brady rule in the guilty plea process.
I. The Issue: Brady Doctrine and the Accuracy
of Guilty Plea Convictions
A. The Brady Rule
The starting point for any discussion of the Brady doctrine is the
original and most often cited formulation of the Brady rule: "the sup-
pression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon
request violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt
or to punishment, irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prose-
cution."9 The original Brady opinion went on to define "evidence
favorable to the accused" as that which "would tend to exculpate him or
to reduce the penalty."' 0 The wording of the rule indicates that its oper-
ation is contingent on a number of factors, such as the materiality of the
evidence and a defense request. Arguing that Brady implies a constitu-
tional right to broad discovery and disclosure in criminal proceedings,
proponents of government openness in criminal proceedings have urged
expansive interpretation of these factors.II
The Supreme Court, however, has rejected explicitly the claim that
Brady created a constitutional right to discovery. 12 Rather than reading
9. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
10. Id. at 88. Lower courts have varied in interpreting the term "evidence" in the Brady
rule. Some view Brady material as limited to admissible evidence, but others include material
that could readily lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. Still others treat admissibility
as irrelevant. Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 4, at 1159; see also Com-
ment, The Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose: From Brady to Agurs and Beyond, 69 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 197, 209-11 (1978) (authored by Michael E. Rusin) (discussing admissibility as
a factor in determining materiality of exculpatory evidence).
11. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 702 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
("I would return to the original theory and promise of Brady and reassert the duty of the
prosecutor to disclose all evidence in his files that might reasonably be considered favorable to
the defendant's case."); Comment, Brady v. Maryland and the Prosecutor's Duty to Disclose, 40
U. CHI. L. REV. 112, 135-40 (1972) (authored by Victor Bass); Comment, The Prosecutor's
Constitutional Duty to Reveal Evidence to the Defendant, 74 YALE L.J. 136, 142-50 (1964).
12. "An interpretation of Brady to create a broad, constitutionally required right of dis-
covery 'would entirely alter the character and balance of our present systems of criminal jus-
tice.' " United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 675 n.7 (quoting Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66,
117 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting)). "There is no general constitutional right to discovery in a
criminal case, and Brady did not create one ... ." Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559
(1977). For a discussion of the incompatibility of an expansive reading of Brady with the
values inherent in an adversary system of criminal justice, see Babcock, Fair Play: Evidence
Favorable to an Accused and Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 STAN. L. REV. 1133, 1134
(1982).
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the Brady rule expansively, the Court has limited its scope severely
through a tightly circumscribed definition of materiality, restricting the
disclosure obligation to evidence that is highly outcome determinative in
the context of the particular case. Evidence currently qualifies for Brady
disclosure "only if there is a reasonable probability that, had the evidence
been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding would have
been different."' 3
While the Court's current treatment of materiality is quite restric-
tive, its treatment of other factors dictating the scope of the prosecutor's
disclosure obligation has been more generous. For example, although
use of the word "suppression" in the Brady rule suggests that it is aimed
at purposeful concealment of evidence, subjective culpability on the part
of a particular prosecutor is not required. The original Brady rule clearly
makes the fact of good faith or bad faith irrelevant.14 Rather than focus-
ing solely on the particular prosecutor handling the case at the time the
disclosure issue arises, the rule focuses on the prosecutor's office as an
entity.' 5 In addition, the Court has included impeachment evidence as a
type of exculpatory evidence encompassed by the rule.' 6
In comparison with the factors treated above, the fate of the request
facet of the Brady rule under current doctrine is more ambiguous. At
one time, the Court treated a defense request for specific information as
triggering a broader materiality standard than that applicable if either no
request or a general request had been made.' 7 Under present doctrine,
however, the request has no explicit effect on the scope of the materiality
standard. The request is relegated to the vague status of a fact that "the
reviewing court may consider ... in light of the totality of the circum-
stances" in applying the materiality standard.' 8
13. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)).'
14. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. at 87 (withholding material, exculpatory evidence fol-
lowing a request by the accused violates due process "irregardless of the good faith or bad faith
of the prosecution").
15. Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972) (one prosecutor's promise attributed
to entire government).
16. Bagley, 437 U.S. at 676-77.
17. See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976). According to Agurs, if a specific
request had been made for the item of evidence, it was material if it "might have affected the
outcome of the trial." Id. at 104. If no request or a general request had been made, evidence
was material if it created "a reasonable doubt which did not otherwise exist." Id. at 112.
18. Bagley, 473 U.S. at 683. The significance of a request continues to be the subject of
uncertainty. See Note, Specific Requests and the Prosecutorial Duty to Disclose Evidence: The
Impact of United States v. Bagley, 1986 DUKE L.J. 892, 902-06 (authored by Paul G. Nofer).
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B. Application of the Brady Rule in Plea Bargaining
The Brady rule's original formulation does not address the issue of
its application to guilty pleas and their negotiation. Nor does the Brady
case address this issue elsewhere. 19 Since all of the cases in which the
Supreme Court has applied and developed the Brady doctrine involved
convictions obtained by means of a trial, the Supreme Court has never
confronted the issue directly and has never adverted to it in dicta. 20
Although the question of the Brady rule's application to guilty pleas has
been posed by leading scholars in the area of criminal procedure and
ethics,21 few have attempted to analyze or resolve the question.22 Some
commentators have simply assumed without analysis that Brady applies
19. This fact is not surprising in light of the uncertain legitimacy of the negotiated guilty
plea at the time Brady was decided. In 1963 the Supreme Court had not yet adopted its
current attitude toward the negotiated guilty plea as an essential and highly desirable part of
the criminal process. The Supreme Court had not even recognized the negotiated guilty plea
as a major component of the criminal process, much less accepted it as the primary mechanism
for resolving questions of guilt. See Alschuler, Plea Bargaining and Its History, 79 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 40 (1979). The Supreme Court has stated in reference to the negotiated guilty plea
that it was not until the decision in Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1971), "that
lingering doubts about the legitimacy of the practice were finally dispelled." Blackledge v.
Allison, 431 U.S. 63, 76 (1977).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 674-78 (1985) (court trial); United
States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103-14 (1976) (jury trial); Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 794-95
(1972) (jury trial); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153-54 (1972) (jury trial); Giles v.
Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 73-82 (1967) (jury trial); Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. at 86-88 (jury
trial).
21. See G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, supra note 4, at 352; Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE &
J. ISRAEL, supra note 4, at 1221-22; A. KAUFMAN, supra note 4, at 387; T. MORGAN & R.
ROTUNDA, supra note 4, at 269; S. SALTZBURG, supra note 4, at 774 n.34.
22. Two student commentators have considered the issue. See Note, The Prosecutor's
Duty to Disclose to Defendants Pleading Guilty, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1004 (1986); Comment,
Disclosure to the Guilty Pleading Defendant: Brady v. Maryland and the Brady Trilogy, 72 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 165 (1981) (authored by Lee Sheppard). The limited analysis of
this issue to date may be explained in a number of ways. The issue seldom is raised before
courts since Brady violations are hard to detect. Unless the defendant somehow fortuitously
learns of the exculpatory information and the prosecution's possession of it, a Brady violation
will never come to light. Moreover, since a guilty plea eliminates trial and appeal as well as the
investigation, preparation, and participation of counsel that trial and appeal entail, there is less
chance a Brady violation will come to a defendant's attention. Thus, defendants who plead
guilty are seldom in a position to raise the issue. The small number of lower court cases
dealing with Brady violations in the guilty plea context is consistent with this proposition.
Defendants also may be unwilling to raise the issue even if a Brady violation is discovered after
entry of a guilty plea because to do so may require an admission of perjury if the defendant's
admission to the crime was made under oath. Courts have held that a defendant's statements
made under oath during a guilty plea proceeding may form the basis for a perjury charge if the
defendant later testifies contrary to the earlier statements. See United States v. Gleason, 766
F.2d 1239, 1245 (8th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1058 (1986); State v. Bennett, 370
S.E.2d 120, 123-27 (W. Va. 1988)
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in the guilty plea context. 23 The few courts that have addressed the issue
have been divided. 24 Their analysis has been varied and generally
superficial.
The ethical and statutory mandates for disclosure during plea bar-
gaining are in a similar state of disarray. The Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, for example, simply fail to address the issue. While the sub-
ject of negotiation ethics has drawn significant scholarly interest in recent
years, the topic has tended to produce "more heat than light."' 25 One
issue on which little, if any, consensus has been achieved is that of disclo-
sure in negotiation. Consequently, the ethical context in which
prosecutorial disclosure issues occur is "a normative no-man's land."'26
Cogent arguments for prosecutorial disclosure in the guilty plea pro-
cess can be predicated on a number of rationales. Claims for disclosure
might simply be based on a notion of fairness in negotiating. 27 Alterna-
23. See McDonald, Cramer & Rossman, Prosecutorial Bluffing and the Case Against Plea
Bargaining, in PLEA BARGAINING 1, 6 (McDonald & Crammer eds. 1980) [hereinafter
Prosecutorial Bluffing].
24. Compare Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d 314, 322 (6th Cir. 1985) (finding the prose-
cution's non-disclosure of Brady material during plea bargaining "certainly objectionable," but
noting that "there is no authority within our knowledge holding that suppression of Brady
materialprior to trial amounts to a deprivation of due process.") and United States v. Wolczik,
480 F. Supp. 1205, 1210 (W.D. Pa. 1979) ("a defendant cannot expect to obtain Brady mate-
rial for use in a pretrial decision to plead guilty") with Fambo v. Smith, 433 F. Supp. 590, 598
(W.D.N.Y. 1977) (refusing to overturn the guilty plea conviction in the case due to lack of
prejudice, but stating that "[i]n order to maintain the integrity of the plea bargaining process
and to assure that a guilty plea entered by a defendant is done so voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently, a prosecutor has a duty, during the course of plea bargaining, to disclose to the
defendant evidence that is as clearly exculpatory of certain elements of the crime charged as is
the contested evidence in this case.") aff'd, 565 F.2d 233 (1977); Lee v. State, 573 S.W.2d 131,
134-35 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (holding that when "exculpatory evidence existed at the time of
the guilty plea which reasonably would have led the defendant not to so plead" and "was
known to and suppressed by the prosecutor.., the defendant should be entitled to withdraw
his guilty plea.") and Ex Parte Lewis, 587 S.W.2d 697, 701 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) ("We hold
that the prosecutor's duty to disclose favorable information (whether relating to the issue of
competence, guilt, or punishment) extends to defendants who plead guilty as well as to those
who plead not guilty."). When the prosecutor has failed to disclose strategic information dur-
ing plea bargaining that would have changed the defendant's mind about entering a guilty plea
but did not bear on guilt or punishment, courts have refused to find a Brady violation. See,
e.g., People v. Jones, 44 N.Y.2d 76, 85, 375 N.E.2d 41, 44-45 (finding no Brady violation based
on prosecutor's failure to disclose death of complaining witness during plea bargaining), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 846 (1978).
25. Hazard, The Lawyer's Obligation to be Trustworthy When Dealing with Opposing Par-
ties, 33 S.C.L. REV. 181, 192 (1981) (discussing the Kutak Commission's 1980 proposal of an
ethical rule of fairness in negotiations encompassing a duty of disclosure of material facts).
The current state of negotiation ethics is reviewed in more detail in section III(B).
26. McDONALD, CRAMER & ROSSMAN, Prosecutorial Bluffing, supra note 23, at 3.
27. See Rubin, A Causerie on Lawyers' Ethics in Negotiation, 35 LA. L. REV. 577, 589-93
(1975). The Supreme Court has stated that the considerations it has relied on in finding the
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tively, disclosure could be viewed on deontological grounds as an intrin-
sic right of the defendant and an intrinsic obligation of the prosecutor.
One also could assert that failure to disclose vitiates the waiver of consti-
tutional rights inherent in a guilty plea by rendering it "unintelligent. '28
Analysis of plea bargaining as a market mechanism 29 might lead to the
claim that failure to disclose results in inefficiency.
The few commentators, courts, and model code authors venturing
an answer to the question of the appropriateness of prosecutorial disclo-
sure in plea bargaining have ignored, denied, or discounted an accuracy
rationale focusing on the protection of innocent defendants from convic-
tion. Professor Uviller has commented that an accuracy rationale should
render prosecutorial disclosure of Brady material irrelevant. 30 Another
commentator, while arguing for application of Brady to guilty pleas, has
discounted the risk that failure to apply Brady could lead to innocent
defendants pleading guilty. 31 Although some courts dealing with the is-
negotiated guilty plea to be an essential and highly desirable part of the criminal process "pre-
suppose fairness in securing agreement between an accused and a prosecutor." Santobello v.
New York, 404 U.S. 257, 261 (1971). See also Comment, supra note 22, at 201 ("Fairness in
plea bargaining can ... be fostered by a rule that a guilty plea does not cure an antecedent
violation of the prosecutorial duty to disclose .. ")
28. See Commen't, supra note 22 at 185-189; Comment, The Case for Preplea Disclosure,
90 YALE L.J. 1581, 1582-83 (1981) (authored by Eleanor J. Ostrow) ("disclosure must be
broad in scope to ensure the defendant a meaningful opportunity to assess his chances of ac-
quittal, and thereby to make meaningful the consent on which the legitimacy of plea bargain-
ing rests"). The standard for determining the validity of a guilty plea "was and remains
whether the plea represents a voluntary and intelligent choice among the alternative courses of
action open to the defendant." North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 31 (1970).
29. For an essay using the tools of positive economics to analyze the market-like features
of plea bargaining, see Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL
STUD. 289, 308-22 (1983).
30. Uviller, Pleading Guilty: A Critique of Four Models, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.,
102, 114 (Winter 1977).
31. Note, supra note 22, at 1013-14 (During plea bargaining, suppression of evidence
favorable to the accused poses two dangers: it could either induce innocent defendants to
plead guilty or compel guilty defendants to plead guilty to charges more serious than the
crimes they committed. The first of these problems "shocks our sensibilities, but is less impor-
tant than it seems: observers agree that the criminal justice system accuses very few truly
innocent persons of crime."). The primary danger posed by failure to apply Brady, according
to this commentator, is the inaccuracy of compelling "guilty defendants to plead guilty to
charges more serious than the crimes they committed," a risk presented because failure to
disclose unfairly erodes the defendant's bargaining power in plea negotiations. Id. at 1015.
Another student commentator has used various models to analyze the issue of the Brady rule's
application to plea negotiations, among them a "factual basis" model related to accuracy.
Comment, supra note 22, at 192-95. This Comment's treatment of the "factual basis" model
and the general topic of accuracy is cursory. The Comment rejects the "factual basis" model,
along with several other models, since they "fail to provide an adequate safeguard of the guilty
pleading defendant's right to disclosure because their logically appealing distinctions break
down when applied to real cases." Id. at 196.
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sue have mentioned accuracy in passing, none have explored the accu-
racy implications or placed primary reliance on this ground.32 The few
model codes requiring disclosure prior to a guilty plea have utilized pri-
marily a fairness, and not an accuracy, rationale. 33 Perhaps the failure to
recognize or utilize an accuracy rationale stems from the fact that the
alternative rationales for disclosure suggested above intuitively seem bet-
ter suited for assessing negotiations than an accuracy rationale. It would
seem inapt, for instance, to evaluate the negotiation of a sale price, con-
tract term, or settlement of a civil case in terms of "accuracy." Rather, it
seems more appropriate to evaluate the bargaining process and its results
in terms such as fairness or efficiency. Nonetheless, there are several im-
portant reasons for exploring the accuracy implications of disclosure in
plea negotiations.
First, the accuracy issue derives its deepest significance simply from
the importance of avoiding the conviction and punishment of the inno-
cent. Shielding the innocent from punishment is pervasive in the justifi-
cations for punishment that form the underpinnings of the substantive
criminal law.3 4 The closely related ideal of accurate determination of
32. In Fambo v. Smith, 433 F. Supp. 590, 599 (W.D.N.Y. 1977), for example, the court
noted that without Brady material being disclosed, "the trial court that accepted the plea could
not, in fact, satisfy itself in any meaningful sense that petitioner's guilty plea was voluntarily
and intelligently made by an informed defendant with adequate advice of counsel, and that
there was nothing to question the accuracy and reliability of this defendant's admission that he
had committed the crime with which he had been charged." The court, however, ventured no
further in analyzing the accuracy implications of Brady disclosure for guilty pleas.
33. Details of these codes are provided infra section III(B).
34. The lodestar of modem substantive criminal law codification and reform, the Model
Penal Code, provides that one of its general purposes is "to safeguard conduct that is without
fault from condemnation as criminal." MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.02(l)(c) (1962). The com-
ment to this section states:
The penal law promotes the general security not only by repressing conduct that is
properly condemned as criminal but also-and no less importantly-by building con-
fidence that those whose conduct does not warrant moral condemnation will not be
convicted ot a crime. This is, indeed, a necessary corollary of the nulla crimen sine
lege principle. The values sought to be protected by the rule of law demand as well
that law should be so fashioned that abusive condemnation is not sanctioned in its
name.
1 MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 1.02 comment 2c (1985). For a review of
approaches to the issue of punishing the innocent among major legal theorists, see M. GOLD-
ING, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 79-83 (1975). Endorsement of the value of protecting the innocent
from the criminal sanction has not, however, been universal. See, e.g., B. WOOTTON, CRIME
AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 32-84 (1963). The general tenor of theorists such as Lady Wootton
is that "[m]oral innocence should . .give way to social dangerousness as the basis for a
criminal disposition." Kadish, The Decline of Innocence, 26 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 273, 273 (1968).
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guilt in the distribution of punishment is also widely shared and deeply
rooted in the tradition of due process.3 5
The negotiated guilty plea necessarily implicates these values. A
guilty plea is a criminal conviction. 36 As such it stigmatizes a defend-
ant37 and legitimizes the exercise against him of the state's most coercive
power, the criminal sanction. The combination of stigma and risk to lib-
erty and life inherent in the negotiated guilty plea make it unlike other
negotiations, such as a sale, a contract, or the settlement of a civil case.
It makes accuracy as a criterion for assessing guilty pleas and the guilty
plea process not only cogent, but critical. The fact that the aspiration for
accuracy in the criminal process is highly and widely valued makes the
issue of accuracy a logical starting place and a valuable point of reference
in resolving the uncertainty surrounding prosecutorial disclosure in plea
bargaining. Thus, because the same values and concerns are implicated,
accuracy is as important in the guilty plea context as it is in the trial
context. 38
35. The emphasis on accuracy in the current Supreme Court's articulated hierarchy of
values is reflected in its recent statement that "the central purpose of a criminal trial is to
decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence." Delaware v. Van Arsdall,
475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986). The Court's stated commitment to accuracy is discussed infra notes
141-48 and accompanying text. Justice Brennan, a frequent critic of current criminal proce-
dure doctrine, has stated that "[it is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be
diluted by a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being
condemned." In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970). One of the traditional objectives of due
process "is the goal of insuring the reliability of the guilt-determining process-reducing to a
minimum the possibility that any innocent individual will be punished." Kadish, Methodology
and Criteria in Due Process Adjudication-A Survey and Criticism, 66 YALE L.J. 319, 346
(1957).
36. "A plea of guilty is more than a confession which admits that the accused did various
acts; it is itself a conviction; nothing remains but to give judgment and determine punish-
ment." Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
37. "[T]he fact that [a person] has been convicted and punished ... stamps a mark upon
him for life." 2 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 81 (1883).
38. This is not an entirely uncontroversial premise. My argument posits a paradigm of
the guilty plea as an adjudication of the historical facts determining criminal liability, a proce-
dural device aimed in part at accurately answering the same questions of fact submitted to the
jury in the usual criminal trial. A different and competing view of the guilty plea sees it as a
form of dispute resolution in which factual issues are compromised rather than adjudicated, as
in the settlement of a civil case. See Alschuler, The Changing Plea Bargaining Debate, 69
CALIF. L. REV. 652, 683-87 (1981). An argument such as mine, premised on the value of
promoting accurate answers in the guilty plea process to the factual questions posed by a
criminal charge, obviously is rendered irrelevant if one adopts the view that the guilty plea
does not and should not provide accurate answers to these factual questions. The Supreme
Court's attitude toward the guilty plea at times appears to reflect adherence to the adjudication
model of the guilty plea, and at other times to reflect adherence to the compromise model. See
infra note 171.
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A second reason to explore the accuracy implications of disclosure
in plea negotiations is the need to correct the failure of commentators,
courts, and code drafters to realize that the issue has accuracy implica-
tions. One commentator, for example, has stated that a view of the crim-
inal process as a "search for the truth," an accuracy-oriented perspective,
would lead to the conclusion that the prosecutor's disclosure of exculpa-
tory information should be irrelevant in the guilty plea process. 39 Such a
rejection of accuracy claims springs from failure to examine fundamental
assumptions about guilty pleas and to appreciate the effect of disclosure
rules on the dynamics of the plea bargaining process. Examination of
these assumptions and assessment of the interaction between disclosure
rules and the dynamics of plea negotiation is aided significantly by disen-
tangling accuracy claims from claims based on other rationales and eval-
uating them independently.
Third, arguing for Brady disclosure in terms of its accuracy implica-
tions responds to current Supreme Court doctrine. Application of the
Brady rule as a due process requirement for guilty pleas could founder on
a number of doctrinal hazards: the Supreme Court's restrictive view of
the Brady rule, its optimistic view of the accuracy of guilty pleas, or the
expansive view of the loss of constitutional rights through waiver or for-
feiture, which the Court has found implicit in guilty pleas. Without at-
tempting exhaustive treatment of each of these areas of Supreme Court
doctrine, section III(A) suggests that an accuracy rationale for applying
the Brady rule to guilty pleas holds promise as a means for eluding these
doctrinal hazards, largely because of accuracy's recent ascendancy in the
Supreme Court's stated hierarchy of criminal procedure values and, in
particular, accuracy's prominence in the Supreme Court's writing about
both Brady and guilty plea doctrine.
A constitutional disclosure rule grounded in due process is not the
only means for achieving disclosure of Brady material in the guilty plea
context. It also could be achieved by ethical rule or statute. Thus, a
fourth reason to examine the accuracy implications of Brady disclosure is
to provide a rationale for shaping both the ethical and statutory rules of
plea bargaining. Section III(B) is devoted to the ethical and statutory
aspects of Brady disclosure in the guilty plea process.
39. Uviller, supra note 30, at 114-15. ("The extent to which the prosecutor is bound to
divulge such information prior to the defendant's decision to plead guilty depends largely on
one's view of the nature of the litigation process. If it is ... a 'search for the truth,' then all
matters affecting the persuasiveness of the prosecution case should be irrelevant.").
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II. The Accuracy Rationale for Applying Brady to Guilty Pleas
The correlation between Brady disclosure and accuracy can be best
understood by first reviewing two distinct and deeply rooted assumptions
about guilty pleas. Examination of each assumption is critical in assess-
ing the contribution of Brady disclosure to guilty plea accuracy.
The first assumption is that the defendant always knows the facts
that determine his guilt or innocence. In the usual criminal trial, these
facts are found by the jury through a process of evaluation and reasoning
based on evidence. The jury begins the trial fact-finding process with no
knowledge of the facts, weighs the evidence adduced through the trial
process, and then reasons along a chain of logical inferences from the
evidence. At the end of this inferential chain, the jury reaches conclu-
sions about the facts required by the legal definition of the offense
charged and any applicable defense. When this sort of reasoning mecha-
nism is relied on to establish the facts, it is essential that the jury consider
all critical evidence in its rational fact-finding process. Thus, to ensure
the factual accuracy of the jury's factual conclusions, the prosecution
must disclose highly exculpatory evidence available only to it. 40
In the usual guilty plea, the fact-finding task assigned to the jury at
trial is displaced by the defendant's confession. Why should the defend-
ant need exculpatory information disclosed to him in order to provide an
accurate confession of guilt? We assume that, unlike jurors entering the
trial process, the defendant enters the guilty plea process knowing the
facts. Whereas we see the jury at trial as discovering the facts through a
reasoning process based on evidence, we conceive of the defendant in a
guilty plea as simply revealing the crucial facts.41 Although the defend-
ant's strategic decision to plead guilty or to stand trial turns in large part
on evaluation of the evidence, we do not think of the evidence in the case
as having any bearing on his ability to confess accurately. In contrast to
the rational fact-finding mechanism of the trial, we think of the guilty
plea's fact-finding mechanism of defendant revelation as being independ-
ent of the completeness or accuracy of the evidence. Thus, disclosure to
insure a complete and accurate evidentiary basis for reliable fact-finding
seems unnecessary in the guilty plea process.
40. "The due process duty to disclose is based on the elemental notion that a conviction
should rest only on accurate evidence and on a record that is as complete on the question of
innocence as is permitted by the state of information available to the prosecution at trial." C.
WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS § 13.10.5, at 768 (student ed. 1986).
41. The verb "to confess" often is defined as meaning "to disclose or reveal," and the
noun "confession" as meaning "the act of disclosing sins or faults." See WEBSTER'S NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 559 (2d unabridged ed. 1959).
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A second assumption that must be examined to understand the link
between disclosure and accuracy concerns the defendant's sincerity
rather than his knowledge. We assume that a defendant will not falsely
condemn himself by pleading guilty since he knows that the immediate
consequence is a criminal conviction. This assumption relies on the intu-
itive unlikeliness of false self-condemnation in the face of the conse-
quences that attach to a guilty plea and the procedural safeguards of a
guilty plea's trustworthiness. Thus, false confession to a crime seems un-
likely not only because punishment will follow, but also because the de-
fendant has assistance of counsel, the plea takes place in open court,
details are placed on the record, plea bargains are disclosed, and the
court taking the plea satisfies itself that there is a factual basis for the
plea. The Supreme Court's attitude toward guilty pleas reflects just such
an assumption concerning sincerity: "[d]efendants advised by competent
counsel and protected by other procedural safeguards are... unlikely to
be driven to false self-condemnation. '42
The assumptions described above support an argument that there is
no connection between Brady disclosure and either the knowledge or the
sincerity underlying the defendant's confession. According to that posi-
tion, Brady disclosure is a check or safeguard functionally suited to the
adversary system of rational truth determination in which a neutral fact-
finder is charged with deriving factual conclusions from the evidence.
When a defendant pleads guilty and substitutes confession for an adver-
sary determination of guilt by trial, however, this removes the need for
Brady disclosure to assure accuracy. Though access to Brady material
may still be of crucial importance in terms of nonaccuracy criteria,43 dis-
closure as a procedural safeguard would be viewed as ill suited to assur-
ing the accuracy of guilty pleas in the way it does jury verdicts of guilt.
The present guilty plea process reveals the degree to which our
criminal justice system is committed to the dual assumptions that the
defendant knows the facts that determine his guilt and that he is sincere
if he confesses those facts in a guilty plea. When a verbal statement other
than the defendant's forms even part of the basis for a criminal convic-
tion at trial, our system expresses a strong preference for certain safe-
guards of reliability. Both the knowledge and sincerity of the declarant
are normally supported by oath and tested by cross-examination. The
jury observes and evaluates the declarant's demeanor and weighs state-
42. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 363 (1978).
43. Access to Brady material still might be important to the defendant in terms of nonac-
curacy values such as fairness, efficiency, protection of bargaining expectation interests, or
informed waiver of constitutional rights.
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ments on crucial points in the context of a larger story adduced from the
declarant and other witnesses at trial.44 In the guilty plea process, by
contrast, the defendant normally is not cross-examined. No jury evalu-
ates the defendant's demeanor. Admissions to the critical facts normally
are not related within the context of other testimony provided by the
defendant. Nor is there typically any context provided by documents,
other items of physical evidence, or the testimony of other witnesses
within which to evaluate the knowledge or sincerity of the defendant's
confession. Although an oath may be used, it is not required. 4 5
Dispensing in the guilty plea process with the normal trial safe-
guards aimed at assessing the reliability of testimony, reflects our sys-
tem's strong faith in the defendant's knowledge and sincerity in
confessing his guilt. In many cases, this faith in accuracy is well-placed.
It is a mistake, however, to conclude that it is always sound. As the
analysis in the following sections demonstrate, flaws in either knowledge
or sincerity can impair the accuracy of guilty plea confessions, particu-
larly in Brady cases.
A. Guilty Plea Accuracy: The Defendant's Knowledge
The reliability of a defendant's guilty plea confession depends in
part on the defendant's knowledge, which the law of evidence treats as
comprised of his perception and memory of the historical facts that de-
termine his criminal liability. Simply put, if the defendant has not ob-
served and remembered a fact accurately, he cannot be counted on to
reveal it accurately in his guilty plea confession.
44. R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 351-54 (2d ed.
1982). This preference is expressed through constitutional requirements such as the rights to
confrontation and jury trial, and also through the statutory requirements of the hearsay rule.
Even at trial a defendant's confession, as an admission, can avoid some of the trial safeguards.
The contextual safeguard, however, still applies with admissions at trial, and the confession is
not treated as conclusive on the issue of guilt.
45. FED. R. CRIM. P. 11, for example, does not require use of the oath in taking a guilty
plea, although the possibility of its use is referred to in several parts of the text of Rule 11. See
FED. R. CRIM. P. 11 (c)(5), (e)(6). The notes of the Advisory Committee on Rules to the 1974
amendment to Rule 11 state in reference to the factual basis inquiry required by Rule 11 (f)
that "[w]here inquiry is made of the defendant himself it may be desirable practice to place the
defendant under oath." FED. R. CRIM. P. 1 (f) advisory committee's note. The notes of the
Committee on the Judiciary, House Report No. 94-247 states parenthetically, however, that
"[tlhe Committee does not intend its language to be construed as mandating or encouraging
the swearing-in of the defendant during proceedings in connection with the disclosure and
acceptance or rejection of a plea agreement." HOUSE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, FEDERAL
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE AMENDMENTS ACT, H.R. REP. No. 247, 94th Cong., 1st
Sess. 7 n.9 (1975), reprinted in 1975 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 674, 680.
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Trust in a defendant's knowledge seems well placed when we focus
on the defendant's actus reus and mens rea, the traditional components of
criminal liability.46 In regard to elements dealing with his own conduct
and subjective mental state, the defendant normally is in the best position
to know the critical facts. For instance, in the armed robbery hypotheti-
cal that introduces this Article, the defendant seems completely capable
of accurately revealing whether or not he engaged in the required con-
duct of taking property from the person or presence of the victim, using
force, violence, or intimidation. Similarly, in regard to mens rea, the de-
fendant's ability to know the answer to a question about his own purpose,
belief, knowledge, premeditation, deliberation, advertence to risk, or
other subjective mental requirement seems unique. In a homicide case
involving a claim of self-defense, for example, who could determine more
precisely than a defendant pleading guilty whether at the time of the
killing he lacked the honest belief in the necessity of self-defense nor-
mally required for such a defense?4 7 Our intuitive confidence in the de-
fendant's knowledge in regard to conduct and subjective mental state
stems from the defendant's seemingly unparalleled ability to perceive and
remember his own conduct and mental state. Due perhaps to this intui-
tive confidence in the defendant's knowledge concerning mens rea and
actus reus and the prominence of those concepts in our thinking about
criminal liability, the notion that a defendant pleading guilty may not
know a fact critical to the existence of criminal liability is counter-
intuitive.
The fallacy of the generalization that a defendant necessarily knows
all of the facts critical to a determination of his criminal liability is
demonstrated in the hypotheticals that follow. These cases tend to fall
into three categories. First are cases dealing with knowledge problems
based on defects in perception or awareness, in which the defendant
never knew or misperceived information critical either to the definition of
an offense or the applicability of a defense. A second category of cases
deals with knowledge problems based on defects in memory, in which the
defendant cannot remember information critical to liability. Finally, a
third category of cases deals with defects in a defendant's expertise in
resolving factual issues critical to liability.
46. "Crime, as a compound concept, [is] generally constituted only from concurrence of
an evil-meaning mind with an evil-doing hand . Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S.
246, 251 (1952).
47. The Model Penal Code requires only that the belief in the necessity for self-defense be
honest, not that it be reasonable. MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(1) (1962). Most jurisdictions
require that the belief be both honest and reasonable. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, CRIMINAL
LAW § 5.7(c), at 457-58 (2d ed. 1986).
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(1) Defects in Perception or Awareness
A case charging statutory rape provides an example of the first type
of case.48 Since most jurisdictions do not require a defendant to know
the victim's age for conviction of statutory rape and instead apply a level
of culpability less than knowledge to the age element,49 defendants who
are in fact ignorant of the victim's actual age come within the ambit of
statutory rape statutes. The ability of a defendant charged to establish
accurately as part of the factual basis for his guilty plea whether the com-
plainant was under age at the time of the offense is contingent on the
quality of the information available to him concerning that issue.
Ignorance of critical information, such as the complainant's actual
age in a statutory rape case, can result in a defendant's pleading guilty
although no crime actually has occurred. Assume, for example, that the
statute under which the defendant is charged requires that the victim be
under the age of sixteen. The prosecution has made the defendant a
guilty plea offer, but while the plea offer is outstanding, Brady material
regarding the complainant's age comes to the prosecution's attention.
The prosecution obtains evidence that strongly suggests that the com-
plainant and her parents, out of anger at the defendant, misrepresented
her age by several months and that she turned sixteen just prior to the act
of sexual intercourse that is the basis for the statutory rape charge. If the
defendant appears willing to accept the guilty plea offer, the prosecutor
might adopt the attitude that the defendant knows whether he is guilty
and accordingly that the defendant's guilty plea obviates any need to pur-
sue or disclose the Brady material regarding the complainant's age. The
defendant's willingness to plead guilty, however, does not necessarily
guarantee that he knows the girl was below the statutory age and conse-
quently does not remove the need for disclosure in order to avoid an
inaccurate resolution of the age element. Once charged with statutory
rape, the defendant and his lawyer may simply assume, based on the
charge, that the complainant was under sixteen at the critical time. In
short, a defendant uninformed of the existence of the Brady material
might plead guilty because of an erroneous conclusion regarding the es-
sential element of age, just as a jury uninformed of such Brady material
might render a guilty verdict because of the same erroneous conclusion at
trial.
48. Statutory rape is consensual intercourse with a minor below a designated age. S.
KADISH, S. SCHULHOFER & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES 285 (4th ed.
1983).
49. Most jurisdictions apply strict liability to the element of age, while some apply negli-
gence. Id.
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Another type of case in which the defendant may not know that an
element of the crime is missing involves a causation problem. A hypo-
thetical drawn from one of the original Brady case's progenitors, United
States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi,50 provides an illustration. Assume the
defendant committed the felony of armed robbery. During his attempted
escape, a skirmish with the police took place and a police officer was shot
and killed. The defendant has been charged with felony murder based on
the death of the police officer. The defendant was armed with a .45 cali-
ber pistol, while the police officers all were armed with .38 caliber weap-
ons. The prosecution obtains physical evidence and a ballistics report,
which determine that a .38 caliber bullet killed the police officer, but does
not reveal the evidence to the defendant.
The jurisdiction in which the defendant is charged utilizes the
"agency theory" as a limitation on felony murder, pursuant to which
felony murder liability attaches only if the felon or one of his accomplices
rather than a bystander or another police officer shot the decedent.5 '
Thus, the identity of the person who in fact shot the officer is crucial to
determining the defendant's liability for felony murder. If the defendant
pleads guilty, he well might resolve this issue erroneously unless the pros-
ecution discloses the evidence showing that another police officer in fact
shot the decedent.
While our first two hypotheticals dealt with knowledge problems
concerning elements of the offense, such defects can also cause a defend-
ant to be unaware of a fact that could provide him with a defense. Con-
sider, for example, a defendant who has been entrapped by an
acquaintance working as an informant for government narcotics investi-
gators. Investigation of the defendant by the authorities began when a
tip from the informant indicated that the defendant might be interested
in selling illegal drugs. The defendant had no prior involvement in illegal
drug dealings, but was experiencing financial difficulties. The informant
induced the defendant to engage in the illegal drug sale with which he is
presently charged by persuading him that it would provide a quick and
effective cure for his financial woes. In this scenario, the government
through its agent, the informant, obviously has run afoul of the exonerat-
ing principle of entrapment.5 2 As typically occurs in such investigations,
50. 195 F.2d 815, 816-19 (3d Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 904 (1953). Justice Doug-
las relied on the Baldi case in his opinion in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963).
51. See S. KADISH, S. SCHULHOFER & M. PAULSEN, supra note 48, at 497. The "agency
theory" appears to be the majority view. See State v. Canola, 73 N.J. 206, 211-12, 219, 374
A.2d 20, 23, 26-27 (1977); Annotation, Criminal Liability Where Act of Killing is Done by One
Resisting Felony of Other UnlawfulAct Committed by Defendant, 56 A.L.R.3d 239, 242 (1974).
52. "Where a person has no previous intent or purpose to violate the law, but is induced
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the informant then introduced the defendant to an undercover narcotics
officer posing as an interested buyer of illegal drugs. 53 The informant, to
avoid revealing his identity as a government agent, then receded into the
background. The undercover narcotics officer made the final arrange-
ments with the defendant, consummated the sale, and arrested the de-
fendant. At the time of the arrest, the officer obtained all the evidence
needed for the government's case-in-chief against the defendant.
The entrapment defense in this hypothetical turns on a key ingredi-
ent unknown to the defendant: the informant's status as an agent of the
government. At the time of the illegal drug sale, the defendant presuma-
bly was ignorant of the fact that the acquaintance who encouraged him
was actually a government informant, or he would not have gone ahead
with the sale. After the arrest, the defendant may suspect that his ac-
quaintance was an informant but, he lacks the knowledge to resolve that
question accurately. Rather than the defendant's knowledge of his own
conduct or subjective mental state, his knowledge of the critical fact of
the informant's status as a government agent is deficient. Disclosure by
the prosecution would help assure that the defendant's guilty plea does
not resolve inaccurately a critical factual issue on which the defense of
entrapment depends.
This hypothetical is not an esoteric example. The prosecution of
drug cases using informants and raising potential issues of entrapment is
daily fare in both state and federal criminal courts. Frequently, the gov-
ernment has considerable incentive to resist disclosure of an informant's
status simply to protect the informant from reprisal. Moreover, since
informants often work on more than one investigation, a strong incentive
exists for the prosecution to resist disclosure in order to keep the inform-
ant productive for future investigations and to protect the confidentiality
of other investigations already underway.
or persuaded by law enforcement officers or their agents to commit a crime, he is a victim of
entrapment, and the law as a matter of policy forbids his conviction in such a case." I E.
DEvrr, C. BLACKMAR & M. WOLFF, FEDERAL JURY PRACTICE AND INSTRUCTIONS § 13.09
(3d ed. Supp. 1988) (emphasis added).
53. Having the officer rather than the informant make the purchase has several advan-
tages for the prosecution. The officer rather than the informant becomes the primary witness
in the government's case. The officer usually makes a more effective witness than the inform-
ant, whose credibility may be severely impeached on the grounds of financial or other incen-
tives. Having the officer make the purchase also permits the investigating officer to maintain
personal control of the often large amounts of cash that need to be displayed before the defend-
ant will consummate the sale. In addition, the officer then takes personal control of the drugs
and avoids introducing the informant into the chain of custody which must be established for
introduction of the drugs at trial.
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These hypotheticals demonstrate that if we expand our focus beyond
elements of conduct and subjective mental state, the potential for defects
in a defendant's knowledge undermines the validity of the assumption
that a defendant always has the ability to reveal accurately the truth as to
critical factual issues in a guilty plea confession. In regard to elements
dealing with required circumstances, the validity of the assumption that
the defendant necessarily knows the critical facts is clearly unfounded.
In a federal bank robbery case, for example, it is unreasonable simply to
assume a charged defendant knows whether or not the bank's federal
deposit insurance was in effect at the time of the robbery, a circumstance
that is a necessary federal jurisdictional element.5 4 The hypotheticals set
forth above provide additional examples of the potential for defects in a
defendant's knowledge regarding the required circumstance of age in a
charge of statutory rape or the status of an informant as a government
agent in a defense of entrapment. Similarly, with offenses requiring a
certain type or degree of resulting harm, such as bodily injury, property
damage, or property loss, the defendant may not have the knowledge
that would make him capable of simply revealing the type or degree of
harm which he actually caused.55
A defendant's inaccurate determination of the presence of a required
circumstance or result may seem less troubling than his inaccurate evalu-
ation of his own conduct or mental state since absence of a circumstance
or result frequently is not totally exculpatory. Often the lack of one of
these elements only lowers the degree of the crime rather than com-
pletely exonerating the defendant. For example, if the federal jurisdic-
tional circumstance of federally insured status of the bank's funds were
lacking in a bank robbery case, the defendant would still be liable for
robbery under state law. In regard to such jurisdictional circumstances,
it is often asserted that they have "no bearing on a person's culpabil-
ity."'5 6 Such elements, however, are not always limited in function to
54. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a), (f) (1982), United States v. Maner, 611 F.2d 107, 108 (5th Cir.
1980) ("To establish federal jurisdiction and to prove a violation of § 2113, the Government
must show that the bank was insured by the FDIC at the time of the robbery.").
55. 18 U.S.C. § 113(f), for example, penalizes assaults "resulting in serious bodily in-
jury." New York Penal Law § 145.10, defining criminal mischief in the second degree, re-
quires among other elements damage to "property of another person in an amount exceeding
one thousand five hundred dollars." N.Y. PENAL LAW § 145.10 (McKinney 1988).
56. NAT'L COMM. ON REFORM FED. CRIM. LAWS, FINAL REP. § 201 comment (1971);
see also Low, The Model Penal Code, the Common Law, and Mistakes of Fact: Recklessness,
Negligence, or Strict Liability?, 19 RUTGERS L.J. 539, 558-59 (1988) (strict liability is often
advocated for jurisdictional elements of federal offenses because they often are not essential to
the criminality of the defendant's behavior). In regard to lack of a particular result, a com-
ment to the Model Penal Code states that "[w]hat will usually turn on determinations [of
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determining severity. At times, as with government agency in entrap-
ment or the age of the victim in statutory rape, such elements play a
critical role in separating punishable from nonpunishable conduct. Even
in cases in which the role of such elements is limited to determining the
severity of the offense or jurisdiction, the accurate establishment of these
facts is nonetheless of considerable import. Since offense severity can
have a critical impact on length, place, and type of incarceration, inaccu-
racy as to these elements implicates both theoretical and practical con-
cerns with limiting punishment to that which is warranted by the actual
offense. Federal jurisdictional circumstances, even though frequently
limited in function to determining whether a federal or state forum is
appropriate, raise the critical issue of a federal court's subject matter ju-
risdiction, the legitimacy of the exercise of its power to convict, sentence,
and incarcerate a defendant.
Disclosure also may have an effect on accuracy when a guilty plea
entails a question of the fulfillment of objective norms of conduct or
mental state. Crimes and defenses utilizing objective standards of liabil-
ity routinely present questions such as deviation from reasonable stan-
dards of conduct or belief, the resolution of which may be affected by
Brady disclosure. Analyzing the defendant's ability to reveal in a guilty
plea confession accurate answers to such questions, however, is more
complex than assessing his ability to resolve accurately the circumstance
and result elements dealt with above. Accordingly, analyzing the effect
of Brady disclosure on that ability is more complex.
Establishing the culpability for negligent homicide under the Model
Penal Code, for example, requires in part a determination of whether the
defendant's conduct involved "a gross deviation from the standard of
care that a reasonable person would observe" in the defendant's situa-
tion.57 It also requires determinations of whether the risk of death was
"substantial and unjustifiable" and whether the defendant should have
been aware of that risk.5 8 Similarly, in most jurisdictions a claim of self-
defense requires a determination of the reasonableness of the defendant's
belief in the need to use defensive force59 and the defense of provocation
requires a determination of the reasonableness of the provoking circum-
whether the defendant caused the result] is not the criminality of the defendant's conduct, but
the gravity of his offense." MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 2.03 comment 1
(1985). 18 U.S.C. § 113, for example, sets forth a variety of penalties for assaults in which the
result of serious bodily injury is absent. See 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)-(e) (1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
57. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.02(d) (1962) (defining negligence); id. § 210.4 (defining
negligent homicide).
58. See id. § 2.02(d).
59. W. LAFAVE & A. ScoTT, supra note 47, § 5.7(c), at 457.
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stances. 60 It is problematic to expect the typical defendant pleading
guilty to provide accurate answers to questions such as the reasonable-
ness of the defendant's conduct or belief, or the justifiability of taking a
particular risk, in the same way that we rely on a defendant pleading
guilty to reveal the truth about his own conduct or subjective mental
state. First, issues of reasonableness and justifiability are more complex
in most cases than an issue such as conduct. Second, although such
questions are routinely treated as questions of fact to be submitted to the
jury at trial, in many ways they seem more like questions of moral judg-
ment and value than historical fact.61
A hypothetical dealing with the issue of self-defense illustrates the
problems associated with resolving such questions in the context of a
guilty plea.62 Assume the defendant in a case charged with aggravated
assault is a woman who was approached on an urban subway car by two
young men who intended to rob her and were armed with concealed
weapons, which they intended to use in perpetrating the robbery. One of
the young men stood close to the defendant and asked for money. The
other young man stood to one side of the defendant and put one hand
inside a pocket as if reaching for a weapon. Having been the victim of
prior subway crime, the defendant was carrying a loaded pistol. The de-
fendant, interpreting the conduct of the young men as a robbery entailing
a threat of serious bodily injury, pulled her gun and shot the two young
men, seriously wounding but not killing them. Later, medical personnel
attending the young men in a hospital emergency room found a loaded
60. Id. § 7.10, at 654.
61. In his book on the Bernhard Goetz trial, in which the critical issue was the reasona-
bleness of Goetz's actions as self-defense, George Fletcher wrote:
The trial turned not on a simple question of fact, but on a question of moral interpre-
tation. The question was not whether Goetz did the deed, but whether his judgment
in doing it was good or bad .... Beyond the agreed-upon factual premises lay an
unexplored realm of value. Goetz's shooting required evaluation-was it reasonable
in a moral sense?
G. FLETCHER, A CRIME OF SELF-DEFENSE 100 (1988).
62. The facts of this hypothetical are a modified version of the facts presented in the
Bernhard Goetz case, People v. Goetz, 116 A.D.2d 316, 319-20, 501 N.Y.S.2d 326, 329 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1986), treated at length in G. FLETCHER, supra note 61. A number of cases have
presented fact patterns raising this issue. In Griffin v. United States, 183 F.2d 990, 992 (D.C.
Cir. 1950), the defendant claimed self-defense and the prosecution failed to disclose the discov-
ery of an open knife in the victim's pocket. The defendant was convicted at trial. A similar
scenario was presented in Campbell v. Marshall, 769 F.2d 314, 316 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. de-
nied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986), another case in which self-defense was claimed. Investigators
found a semi-automatic pistol in the pocket of the victim and failed to disclose it to the defend-
ant. The defendant, uninformed of the weapon, pleaded guilty. In United States v. Agurs, 427
U.S. 97, 100-01 (1976), the female defendant, after raising a self-defense claim, was convicted
at trial without disclosure of the victim's record of prior violent crime.
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gun in the pocket of one and an open knife in the pocket of the other.
The prosecutor, who has made a guilty plea offer to the defendant, has
been informed of the victims' possession of the weapons, but has not dis-
closed these facts to the defense.
The defendant's criminal liability in this situation obviously turns on
the question of self-defense and on the contours of that defense in the
jurisdiction in which the defendant is charged. If one adopts a purely
subjective view of self-defense, then the only relevant question is whether
the defendant honestly believed in the need for her use of deadly force. 63
This question of subjective mental state does not seem to be an inherently
difficult one for the defendant pleading guilty to answer and, as pointed
out above, the defendant should be capable of accurately resolving it
without disclosure. In our hypothetical, for example, the defendant had
the requisite honest belief and there seems no need to disclose the con-
cealed weapons for her accurately to resolve that question.
If one adopts a purely objective view of self-defense, however, as a
number of commentators have urged, 64 then both the nature of the fac-
tual inquiry and the role of disclosure are fundamentally altered. Under
a purely objective view, the relevant question in our hypothetical is
whether the two young men in fact threatened a harm that the defend-
ant's use of force prevented, even if that threat was not known to the
defendant. This is a more difficult factual question for the defendant to
resolve than the question of her own subjective belief since calculation of
the harm threatened involves a number of variables that in our hypothet-
ical are beyond the defendant's ability to perceive, such as the young
men's intentions and their ability to inflict harm. This factual inquiry
also differs from the question of the defendant's belief under a subjective
theory of self-defense in that disclosure may be critical in order for the
defendant accurately to assess the victim's intentions and ability to inflict
harm. In our hypothetical, for example, the possession of the weapons,
even if unknown to the defendant, helps demonstrate that sufficient harm
63. The Model Penal Code provides an example of a purely subjective approach to self-
defense requiring only an honest belief in the need for self-defense. See MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 3.04(1) (1962).
64. Advocates for the objective view of self-defense include Paul Robinson and Glanville
Williams. See 2 P. ROBINSON, CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 131(e)(6) (1984); G. WILLIAMS,
TEXTBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 504 (2d ed. 1983); Robinson, A Theory of Justification: Socie-
tal Harm as a Prerequisite for Criminal Liability, 23 UCLA L. REV. 266, 283-84, 291-92
(1975). In reference to a hypothetical similar to the self-defense one in the text, Glanville
Williams has written that "the law would be oppressive if it said: It is true that you took this
action because you felt it in your bones that you were in peril, and it is true that you were
right, but you cannot now assign reasonable grounds for your belief, so you were only right by
a fluke and will be convicted." Id.
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actually was threatened to trigger the use of defensive force under an
objective theory of self-defense. Without this disclosure, the defendant
pleading guilty may conclude erroneously that she misjudged the young
men and their intentions and used deadly force unjustifiably under an
objective theory of self-defense.
The law of most jurisdictions is a blend of subjective and objective
requirements. A subjective belief in the need to use defensive force typi-
cally is required.65 Most jurisdictions also require that the defendant's
belief in the need to use defensive force be objectively reasonable, but
limit what can be considered in assessing reasonableness to what was
known or apparent to the defendant.66 The resolution of such a question
of reasonableness in the context of a guilty plea presents a number of
problems. First, as pointed out above, such a question does not call sim-
ply for the revelation by the defendant of a historical fact. Rather, it
calls for an assessment of the norm of reasonable belief in the situation
and then a comparison of the defendant's belief with that norm. In a
typical trial involving negligence, a group of jurors drawn from the com-
munity assesses this norm and compares the conduct in question with it.
The typical guilty plea relies on the defendant to perform accurately each
of these functions simply because he is willing to resolve the ultimate
question of reasonableness against himself. It seems paradoxical, though,
to rely on someone charged with failing to recognize or observe the
norms of reasonable conduct or belief to perform the task of factually
assessing what those norms are. If we treat the question of reasonable-
ness as more of a moral than a factual inquiry, as George Fletcher has
suggested, it seems even more problematic to rely on a criminal defend-
ant's moral judgment about reasonableness. 67 It seems odd as well to
expect the defendant to perform satisfactorily the difficult task of retro-
65. "Of course, whether a reasonable belief is required or not, the defendant must actu-
ally believe in the necessity for force. He has no defense when he intentionally kills his enemy
in complete ignorance of the fact that his enemy, when killed, was about to launch a deadly
attack upon him. Nevertheless, if he acts in proper self-defense, he does not lose the defense
because he acts with some less admirable motive in addition to that of defending himself, as
where he enjoys using force upon his adversary because he hates him." W. LAFAVE & A.
ScoTr, supra note 47, § 5.7, at 458 (emphasis in original).
66. Id. at 457-58; see, e.g., Dixon v. State, 352 S.E.2d 572, 574 (Ga. 1986) ("The.general
rule is that evidence of threats previously made by one who is killed by another but uncom-
municated to the latter, are not admissible on the question of whether the defendant was justi-
fied in killing the victim."); People v. Perez, 66 Mich. App. 685, 692, 239 N.W.2d 432, 435
(1976) ("[tjhe self-defense justification for homicide is based upon the circumstances as they
appeared to the defendant, and not as they actually existed.").
67. See G. FLETCHER, supra note 61, at 100.
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spectively and objectively comparing his own conduct or belief with the
standard of reasonableness.
Once we have decided to rely on the defendant to resolve such is-
sues, though, what is the effect of disclosure on his ability to perform this
task? We have seen that if the test for self-defense is purely objective, the
need for disclosure in our hypothetical is clear, but that if the test is
purely subjective, the need for disclosure appears to be obviated. If the
jurisdiction in question requires the element of reasonable belief based on
what was apparent to the defendant, then disclosure still would play a
role, but a more subtle one than under the purely objective test.
Take the defendant in our hypothetical. If she pleads guilty, accu-
rate resolution of her liability requires her to resolve the issue of the rea-
sonableness of her belief in the need for the use of deadly force in self-
defense. Since this reasonableness is limited to those circumstances ap-
parent to her, it would seem that evidence of danger unknown to the
defendant should be irrelevant for purposes of assessing the reasonable-
ness of her belief.68 In short, the fact that one of the defendants reached
into his pocket as if he had a weapon would be relevant because it was
apparent to the defendant. The contents of the pocket, however, whether
it turned out to be loose change or a loaded gun, should be irrelevant
since the contents were not apparent to the defendant and therefore
could not have contributed to the reasonableness of the defendant's be-
lief. But the effect in the guilty plea context of the disclosure of the exist-
ence of the weapons is not as restricted as its strict evidentiary relevance.
A defendant such as the one in our hypothetical, forced to decide on the
use of deadly defensive force quickly and under ambiguous circum-
stances, later may well question her own judgment and the reasonable-
ness of her belief in the need for self-defense, particularly when it has
caused serious harm to others. The very fact that the government has
68. Evidence of an uncommunicated threat such as a gun or other weapon hidden on the
victim is inadmissible to show a criminal defendant's honest or reasonable belief, but is admis-
sible to show that the victim was the aggressor by virtually all courts. IA Wigmore, Evidence
111 at 1685-90 (Tillers rev. ed. 1983). See, e.g., Griffin v. United States, 183 F.2d 990, 992
(D.C. cir. 1950) ("The view that evidence of uncommunicated threats, including the evidence
of [the victim's] opened knife, should be admitted seems to us logical and humane .... It is of
course true that the apparent conduct of the deceased at the time of the homicide, rather than
any concealed plan he may have had, bears directly on the question whether the accused acted
in self-defense, but evidence that the deceased had a concealed plan of attack bears on the
question what his apparent conduct was. We therefore adopt the following rule as the one we
think should prevail in the District of Columbia. When a defendant claims self-defense and
there is substantial evidence, though it be only his own testimony, that the deceased attacked
him, evidence of uncommunicated threats of the deceased against the defendant is
admissible.")
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charged her with acting unreasonably may give rise to such doubts or
reinforce those that have already occurred. If the existence of the weap-
ons is not disclosed to the defendant, she likely will conclude that the
men she shot were in fact unarmed and may not even have been acting
with the intent of robbing her. Because of this erroneous belief, the de-
fendant might conclude that she overreacted to what she observed. By
contrast, if the victims' possession of the weapons is revealed, the defend-
ant's tendency toward regarding her actions as reasonable will be
reinforced.69
(2) Defects in Memory or Expertise
The problems of a defendant's lack of knowledge dealt with so far
have focused primarily on defects in a defendant's perception or aware-
ness rather than defects in recollection. The last paragraph suggests,
however, that memory defects may also result in a defendant's inability
to establish the facts accurately in a guilty plea confession.70 Voluntary
alcohol or drug intoxication, for example, might result in the inability of
a defendant to recall facts relating to his own conduct or mental state at
the time of the charged offense. If a guilty plea is entered in such a case,
Brady disclosure may be required to insure the accuracy of the defend-
ant's admission of facts that fall within the knowledge of the typical de-
fendant, such as his identity as the perpetrator of the crime.
Guilty plea cases in which the defendant's liability turns on the issue
of mental disease or defect often combine these perception and memory
problems with the more peculiar issue of a defendant's impaired ability to
draw conclusions from the facts. In a case in which insanity at the time
of the crime is a serious issue, it would seem absurd to rely only on the
defendant to determine the applicability of an insanity defense. The de-
fendant obviously lacks the expert qualifications, for example, to deter-
mine whether he was suffering from a mental disease or defect and
whether that disease or defect impaired his capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the law.71
69. The susceptibility of a witness' memory of an event to distortion by information
learned after the event has been well documented. See, e.g., E. Loftus & J. Doyle, EYEWIT-
NESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL § 3.05 (1987); Hall, Loftus & Tousignant, Postevent
Information and Changes in Recollection for a Natural Event, in EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY:
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 124 (1984).
70. In the Bernhard Goetz case, there was considerable question as to whether the ver-
sion of the critical facts recalled by Goetz in his confession was accurate. The testimony of a
number of witnesses supported a version of the facts more favorable to Goetz, which the jury
apparently accepted. See G. FLETCHER, supra note 61, at 122-23.
71. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (1962) provides as follows for mental disease or de-
fect excluding responsibility: "A person is not responsible for criminal conduct if at the time of
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Some defendants, because of mental defects, may be unable to answer
accurately even more straightforward factual questions concerning con-
duct, mens rea, or facts triggering a defense such as self-defense, all of
which are unrelated to mental capacity. 72 In granting a habeas corpus
petition based on prosecutorial failure to disclose in a guilty plea a report
revealing a viable insanity defense as well as other exculpatory informa-
tion, a Texas appellate court concluded: "It would be anomalous to hold
that the (concededly) illiterate, mentally retarded, alcoholic, and (ac-
cording to the psychiatrist), psychotic applicant had a duty to tell his
counsel that there was available evidence of his insanity and incompe-
tence. ' ' 73 It would likewise be anomalous to assume that the confession
of such a defendant provides an accurate revelation of the facts determin-
ing criminal liability.
(3) Brady Disclosure as a Remedy for Defects in Knowledge
The problems regarding a defendant's knowledge reviewed so far are
hardly insurmountable obstacles to accurate fact-finding. Such problems
simply indicate that the fact-finding mechanism of defendant revelation
is not always equal to the task of resolving critical factual issues, some as
simple as the age of the victim in a statutory rape case, others as complex
as the existence of a mental disease or defect. Such facts could be estab-
lished accurately in a number of ways other than by relying on the de-
fendant's guilty plea confession. We could insist on trial of the issues
that are beyond the defendant's capacity to reveal. 74 Without resorting
to an adversarial trial, during the guilty plea process the judge could find
the facts that the defendant is incapable of confessing by relying on a
such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks substantial capacity either to
appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the
requirements of the law."
72. A Texas case, Exparte Lewis, 587 S.W.2d 697 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), illustrates the
dangers in this sort of scenario. The defendant, Lewis, was charged with murder and the trial
court appointed counsel to represent him. On the same day as the appointment of counsel,
Lewis pleaded guilty to the murder charge, later receiving a sentence of five years to life. A
letter from a state psychiatrist in the prosecutor's file at the time of the guilty plea reported the
results of a psychiatric examination of Lewis conducted 11 days before the guilty plea. The
report contained substantial indications of Lewis' present incompetence and his insanity at the
time of the offense, as well as suggestions of mental retardation, alcohol abuse, and a basis for a
claim of self-defense. The letter was not disclosed during the guilty plea process. Id. at 699-
700.
73. Id. at 701.
74. The guilty plea could be treated as resolving only those issues the defendant can
reveal accurately in the same way that partial summary judgment removes only certain issues
from a civil trial. See FED. R. Civ. P. 56; 10A C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & M. KANE, FED-
ERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §§ 2736, 2737 (2d ed. 1983).
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factual basis provided by the government, as in a guilty plea in which the
defendant refuses to confess guilt.75 Or we could simply rely on defense
counsel and the defendant to assess the evidence and make sure that all
of the elements of the applicable-crimes and defenses are resolved accu-
rately before agreeing to a guilty plea. This last proposal probably comes
closest to describing the way factual issues beyond the defendant's
knowledge currently are resolved in guilty plea practice.
Whatever mechanism is chosen, the important point for disclosure
analysis is that resolution of issues beyond the defendant's ability to re-
veal is based on evaluation and reasoning grounded in evidence. Thus, it
is dependent on a complete and accurate evidentiary base for accurate
results, just as the jury is at trial. If we reject the mechanism of defend-
ant revelation normally used in the guilty plea process as being inade-
quate for resolving a particular factual question, our alternative is to
resort to a method of rational fact-finding such as that used by a jury at
trial. And disclosure of critical items of exculpatory evidence is as essen-
tial to any of these mechanisms as it is to the classic jury trial.
The role of Brady disclosure in aiding accuracy in situations in
which the defendant's knowledge of critical facts is lacking or at least
doubtful can be demonstrated easily by referring to the fact issues deline-
ated in the hypotheticals used earlier in this section. The defense of en-
trapment, for instance, would not be resolved accurately by a jury at trial
unless the government revealed the informant's status as a government
agent. In a trial to a court in which all issues have been stipulated except
entrapment, the judge could not resolve the entrapment question accu-
rately without similar disclosure. In an Alford type plea,76 the court
could not make an accurate finding concerning entrapment if the govern-
ment did not disclose the informant's status. Similarly, defense counsel
and the defendant cannot be expected to resolve the question of entrap-
ment accurately without such disclosure.
In short, disclosure of Brady material in the guilty plea process pro-
vides a significant measure of assurance that the defendant, his counsel,
or whatever other factfinder is entrusted with resolving the particular
issue, does not arrive at an erroneous conclusion concerning a critical
fact by relying on an evidentiary base lacking an essential exculpatory
item. Disclosure of highly exculpatory evidence in the guilty plea pro-
cess in such cases helps assure accuracy by alerting the defense to exoner-
ating facts that the defendant may be incapable of providing and
75. See North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 28, 38 n.10 (1970); see also supra note 7.
76. See Alford, 400 U.S. at 38 n.10; see also supra note 7.
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allowing those facts to be taken into account in the reasoning process
used to decide the critical facts.
The need for Brady disclosure as a safeguard against a defendant's
lack of knowledge is restricted to the category of cases in which the de-
fendant's knowledge of critical facts or mental capacity is questionable. 77
Thus, the force of this claim for enhancing guilty plea accuracy by Brady
disclosure is confined to those Brady cases in which the defendant cannot
accurately resolve critical factual issues. Such cases are a clearly limited
subset not only of all guilty plea cases, but also of all Brady cases. As the
range of hypotheticals in this section demonstrates, however, the inci-
dence of such cases should not be considered insignificant. Within that
range of cases, Brady disclosure plays as important a role as it does in the
trial context.
Problems with perception, memory, or expertise regarding historical
facts may be compounded if the defendant's mental competence at the
time of the guilty plea is in question. Such problems may also be com-
pounded by forces undermining the sincerity of the defendant's confes-
sion, which may make the defendant hesitant to reveal his lack of
knowledge. It is to the problem of sincerity rather than knowledge that
we turn next.
B. Guilty Plea Accuracy: The Defendant's Sincerity
In the debate over plea bargaining, concern about inaccurate bar-
gained pleas resulting from a defendant's insincerity, as opposed to his
ignorance of important facts, has been a persistent theme. The language
of the Supreme Court guilty plea cases emphasizes the accuracy of guilty
pleas. 78 The Court's attitude, however, has been to assume such accu-
racy without seriously questioning it. Critics of plea bargaining have
been skeptical of such an assumption, emphasizing in particular the sub-
verting influence on a defendant's sincerity of inducements to plead
guilty, particularly inducements in the form of sentencing differentials. 79
77. In some cases, there may be ambiguity as to whether the facts, once established, are
legally sufficient to constitute a crime. Consequently, a question is raised about the defendant's
"knowledge" of his guilt. This would seem most likely to occur in offenses with complex
definitions, such as some white collar crimes, or in those cases that arise at the margin of the
definition of any offense. Advice of counsel and the requirement of an evaluation of the legal
sufficiency of the facts by the judge as part of the guilty plea process would remedy uncertainty
about legal sufficiency. My primary focus, though, is on the defendant's knowledge of the
underlying historical facts rather than their legal sufficiency.
78. See infra note 171.
79. A sentencing differential is simply the difference between the sentence faced by a
defendant if he takes his case to trial and the sentence faced by the same defendant if he pleads
guilty. Most frequently the differential is quantitative, expressed in months or years of incar-
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This section focuses on a novel function for Brady disclosure, pro-
viding a check on the pressure to plead guilty generated through the use
of sentencing differentials in the negotiation of Brady cases. In particu-
lar, it examines the influence the Brady trial rule exerts-the "shadow" it
casts-on guilty plea negotiations.8 0 The analysis in this section demon-
strates that refusing to apply the Brady rule to guilty pleas allows that
"shadow" to distort the incentive structure of plea negotiations in a way
that undermines factual accuracy.
(1) The Impact of Sentencing Differentials on the
Sincerity of Self-Condemnation
The idea that an innocent defendant would condemn himself falsely
in a guilty plea initially strikes one as implausible since a guilty plea en-
tails considerable and immediate negative consequences. As in the law of
evidence, the psychological assumption is "that persons do not make
statements which are damaging to themselves unless satisfied for good
reason that they are true.""' In the guilty plea context, admitting to a
crime is clearly damaging: it constitutes a criminal conviction with all
the detrimental consequences that flow from conviction. 82 The defend-
ant entering a guilty plea is made aware of these consequences by the
court at the time of his admission of guilt.8 3 It seems unlikely, then, that
a defendant would admit to a crime in open court with advice of counsel
and the other procedural safeguards that accompany a guilty plea unless
he was in fact guilty.
ceration or risk of incarceration. The sentencing differential can have a qualitative aspect as
well. If the maximum sentence after trial is capital punishment, for example, an offer to plead
to a fixed term of years carries an inducement that cannot be expressed simply in quantitative
terms. The sentencing differential also can have a monetary aspect, depending on the amount
of fines and restitution that may be imposed after trial and after plea. The increased use of
monetary and forfeiture penalties in criminal law makes such a monetary dimension increas-
ingly likely in white collar plea bargaining.
80. Focus on the effect of legal rules on negotiations has been advocated by Professors
Mnookin and Komhauser in Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88
YALE L.J. 950, 951-52 (1979). This approach departs from the traditional analytic preoccupa-
tion with the effect of legal rules on cases adjudicated in court, considering instead the
"shadow" that legal rules cast over out of court negotiations and bargaining, "how the rules
and procedures used in court for adjudicating disputes affect the bargaining process that oc-
curs ... outside the courtroom." Id. at 951 (emphasis in original). Although their immediate
concern was divorce negotiations, they noted that their perspective has implications in other
contexts, such as plea bargaining. Id. at 997.
81. FED. R. EVID. 804(b)(3) advisory committee's note (statement against interest excep-
tion to the hearsay rule).
82. See supra notes 36-37.
83. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44 (1969); FED. R. CRIM. P. 1l(C).
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Inducements to plead guilty, and sentencing differentials in particu-
lar, undermine the psychological basis for this assumption. Although the
element of damage from conviction and exposure to punishment are
present in any guilty plea, the offering of a sentencing differential in-
troduces a significant element of benefit from the admission. If the de-
fendant has accepted the bargain, he must think that the benefit
outweighs the damage. 84 If what is to be gained from the admission out-
weighs in the defendant's mind the damage to be incurred, then the psy-
chological basis for our initial faith in the truth of the admission as a
statement against interest is largely negated. In more precise terms, the
sentencing differential converts the confession from a statement against
interest into what is on balance a self-serving one.
The hypothetical used to introduce this essay, involving a criminal
defendant accused of armed robbery and facing as much as fifteen years
in prison if convicted at trial, illustrates the effect of sentencing differen-
tials. The prosecutor, whom we will assume to be highly motivated to
avoid trial, offers a five year term of incarceration if the defendant pleads
guilty. Whether the defendant, whom we will assume is innocent, resists
the offer and runs the risk of an additional ten years in his sentence if
convicted at trial depends in large part on the defendant's perception of
his chance for acquittal and his degree of risk aversion. If the defendant
resists the offer and the prosecutor increases the differential by decreasing
the sentence in her plea offer, the prosecutor is almost certain to strike a
point at which the benefits of the guilty plea's leniency and certainty out-
weigh the risk of trial in the defendant's mind, even if he is innocent.8 5
Can we be certain that an innocent defendent would reject an offer of one
year of incarceration for a guilty plea and risk instead fifteen years' im-
prisonment after trial if, as in our hypothetical, he has a prior record and
believes the victim has positively identified him? If the defendant resists
this offer, the prosecutor may increase the differential even further. If the
prosecutor were to offer straight probation for a guilty plea, a tremen-
dous incentive is created even for an innocent defendant not to run the
84. Factors other than the sentencing differential, such as family pressures and desire to
avoid the cost and publicity of a trial, may also induce a defendant to plead guilty regardless of
guilt. See Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179,
1192-94 (1975).
85. The certainty offered by a guilty plea, quite apart from any leniency, is an attractive
feature to many defendants. "[M]ost people-rich or poor-have a low tolerance for uncer-
tainty. Defense attorneys report that after a long delay, the defendant becomes anxious for any
action to terminate his case and tends to become less concerned with the specific outcome or
procedures involved." Levin, Delay in Five Criminal Courts, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 111 (1975).
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risk of imprisonment after trial when the alternative is a criminal convic-
tion with no risk of incarceration.
The pressure of sentencing differentials is not limited to serious cases
in which the defendant faces a heavy penalty after trial. Another hypo-
thetical illustrates this point. Assume a minor theft case in which the
defendant faces a possible term of two years imprisonment after trial.
Unable to make bail, the defendant is detained pending trial. A week
after his initial incarceration, and with another sixty days remaining until
trial, the prosecutor offers a plea to a reduced charge and agrees to imme-
diate sentencing at which the defendant will be sentenced to the seven
days already served. If the defendant pleads guilty, he is out of jail im-
mediately and runs no risk of further incarceration. If he insists on trial,
however, he faces the certainty of at least another two months of incar-
ceration awaiting trial and the risk of incurring further incarceration of
up to two years if convicted. Again, there is a substantial incentive for a
rational, innocent defendant to plead guilty.86
These hypotheticals focus on the incarceration consequences of a
defendant's choice between pleading guilty and facing trial. The collat-
eral consequences of conviction, such as social stigmatization as a crimi-
nal and harm to future employment, create additional disincentives apart
from incarceration that may be enough to keep the innocent defendant
from pleading guilty even in the face of a substantial sentencing differen-
tial. This issue needs to be analyzed separately for two distinct groups of
defendants, those without prior criminal records and those with such
records.
For criminal defendants without a prior record, the collateral conse-
quences of a conviction undoubtedly add powerful disincentives to plead-
ing guilty quite apart from sentencing exposure. Such defendants, by
definition inexperienced with the criminal justice system, may also tend
to overvalue their chances for acquittal at trial, reinforcing their resist-
ance to inducements to plead guilty. Such defendants may believe justifi-
ably that their lack of a prior record provides some informal guarantee of
leniency at sentencing both at the hands of the prosecutor and the judge,
thus reducing the need for the protection offered by the plea. It seems
86. The sentencing differential may gain a qualitative aspect not just by the nature of the
sentence threatened after trial, such as capital punishment but also by the nature of the sen-
tence offered with the plea. When the prosecutor offers a sentence that results in immediate
release, such as probation or a sentence to time served while awaiting trial, the availability of
immediate freedom adds something to the differential which again cannot be captured simply
by a number. Judge Easterbrook has commented on this tendency to discount future criminal
sanctions: "For many people the opportunities of the present seem more important than those
of the future. . . " Easterbrook, supra note 29, at 294.
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less likely, then, that the prosecutor will be able to offer a strong enough
inducement to overcome these disincentives. But certainly the sentenc-
ing differential offered could be great enough-as in a case in which life
imprisonment is risked after trial and the prosecution offers a minimal
sentence for a guilty plea-to overcome the collateral forces reinforcing
the defendant's aversion to pleading guilty.
For a defendant with a criminal record, the calculation of the rela-
tive advantages of a guilty plea and a trial will be quite different. First,
the negative force of the collateral consequences of the plea will tend to
be greatly reduced. Such defendants already have incurred the damage
of stigmatization as a criminal from prior convictions. In many cases,
the collateral consequences of an additional conviction will not add
much marginal disincentive to pleading guilty.87 In addition, the defend-
ant with a prior record probably will be considerably less optimistic than
a defendant without a criminal record about his chances for acquittal at
trial. In part, this attitude may simply be the result of cynicism bred by
experience. Or it may be the result of the quite rational realization that a
defendant with a prior record faces significant disadvantages at trial com-
pared with a defendant with no record.88 In addition, the fact that a
criminal record most likely will result in a higher sentence upon convic-
tion gives the defendant with a record a greater need for the relative
advantages of the plea. In sum, it would seem that for a criminal defend-
ant with a prior record-whether innocent or not-the point at which a
guilty plea offer's benefits outweigh the advantages of trial is reached
more easily by the prosecutor's offer of a sentencing differential. For this
reason, we should be concerned particularly about the susceptibility to a
plea offer of an innocent defendant with a criminal record.
One might ask whether the advice of counsel would protect against
this sort of pressure toward false self-incrimination. Many factors, how-
ever, work toward inclining the defense attorney to prefer guilty pleas
over trials, such as financial incentives, heavy caseloads, and pressures
from prosecutors and judges to process cases efficiently. 89 Even if the
87. If the additional conviction is for a particularly heinous crime, such as sexual abuse of
a child, or if the additional conviction triggers the provisions of a recidivist statute, then pow-
erful collateral disincentives can be present even for the defendant with a prior record.
88. The defendant with a prior record may be impeached by certain prior crimes. See
FED. R. EvID. 609(a). Or he simply may be influenced not to testify by the threat of such
impeachment. Prior crimes also may be admitted into evidence "as proof of motive, opportu-
nity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident." FED.
R. EvID. 404(b). Once the jury learns of a defendant's prior record, the effect on the verdict
tends to be substantial. See H. KALVEN & H. ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 1159-61 (Phoe-
nix ed. 1971).
89. Alschuler, supra note 84.
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defense attorney resists such pressures, anecdotal evidence suggests that
many defense lawyers, even if uncertain of the client's guilt, are ex-
tremely reluctant to stand in the way of a client's pleading guilty, if the
guilty plea gives the defendant what both the defendant and counsel per-
ceive as a "good deal." 90 Such a situation pits the client's interest in
minimizing risk against the criminal justice system's interest in accu-
rately determining the truth. The criminal defense lawyer is admonished
repeatedly to prefer his client's interests over the truth-finding interest of
the criminal justice system.91 Moreover, the defense lawyer is also in-
structed that final responsibility for the decision to plead guilty rests with
the defendant and not with counsel.92 Finally, even if counsel resists the
innocent defendant's choice to plead guilty, the defendant can put his
'lawyer's qualms to rest and reduce this barrier to pleading by simply
falsely admitting guilt to his counsel. Thus, the presence of defense
counsel provides little protection against the pressure of sentencing dif-
ferentials undermining the sincerity of a defendant's guilty plea.
(2) Brady Cases and the Generation of Sentencing Differentials
What are the chances that prosecutors will offer differentials of suffi-
cient magnitude to reach an innocent defendant's risk aversion point? It
is clear that the prosecutor legally may offer differentials of such magni-
tude that an innocent and even moderately risk averse defendant would
find them tempting. There is presently no limit on the size of sentencing
differentials that may be offered to a defendant,93 although commentators
90. Id. at 1280-306. In my own experience teaching criminal process, I have found that a
hypothetical posing the dilemma of a defendant claiming innocence but confronted with an
attractive plea offer brings advice from roughly half the class that the defendant should accept
the guilty plea offer and not risk trial.
91. Whether the defense attorney may ethically advise or allow a client who claims inno-
cence to plead guilty other than through the use of an Alford plea, discussed supra at note 7, is
a matter of some controversy. See I TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES
215 (1984) ("Views differ on whether a lawyer may properly advise (or even permit) a client to
plead guilty who protests his or her innocence.... Obviously, a client who believes and asserts
that s/he is innocent should not be advised to plead guilty unless the client, as well as counsel,
is very strongly convinced that is plea is distinctly to the client's best advantage. This condi-
tion met, the hard decision follows.") For opposing points of view on the criminal defense
lawyer's ethical obligations in this situation, compare Burger, Standards of Conduct for Prose-
cution and Defense Personnel, 5 AM. CRIM. L.Q. 11, 15 (1966) with Bowman, Standards of
Conduct for Prosecution and Defense Personnel An Attorney's Viewpoint, 5 AM. CRIM. L.Q.
28, 31 (1966).
92. "A defense lawyer in a criminal case has the duty to advise his client fully on whether
a particular plea to a charge appears to be desirable.., but it is for the client to decide what
plea should be entered ...... MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7
(1980).
93. In Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 358-59 (1978), the defendant was offered
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have urged such limits. 94 Moreover, a number of factors may motivate
the prosecutor to plea bargain and offer the inducement of a sentencing
differential even if in doing so the prosecutor severely discounts her case.
She may feel simply that the lower sentence is appropriate in the particu-
lar case. She may have limited resources. Or she may feel that she has a
weak case. The incentive to negotiate a guilty plea based on a weak case
has been noted to pose a particular threat to accuracy in guilty pleas
since it tends to combine questionable guilt with a strong inducement to
plead guilty. In other words, "the greatest pressures to plead guilty are
brought to bear on defendants who may be innocent. ' 95 The incentive to
negotiate a guilty plea due to a weak case is of particular interest in as-
sessing the importance of the Brady rule in plea bargaining.
Judge Frank Easterbrook's plea bargaining model provides an excel-
lent illustration of this tendency. 96 According to Easterbrook's model,
the prosecutor's "minimum settlement demand" in bargaining is "deter-
mined by the penalty the prosecutor thinks he may obtain after trial"
plus the difference between the cost of trial and the cost of plea bargain-
ing.97 Our primary interest is in the part of the equation dependent on
the choice between five years if he pleaded guilty and mandatory life imprisonment if he went
to trial. The defendant refused the offer, was convicted and then sentenced to life imprison-
ment. In Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 743 (1970), the defendant pleaded guilty to
avoid the death penalty. The Court has found no problem with the offering of inducements of
such magnitude. It has yet to indicate any limits on the size of differentials used in plea bar-
gaining. If anything, the ability of the prosecutor to offer powerful sentencing differentials has
increased with the use of determinate sentencing. See Alschuler, Sentencing Reform and
Prosecutorial Power: A Critique of Recent Proposals for "Fixed" and "Presumptive" Sentenc-
ing, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 550, 572 (1978).
94. See Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion as a Regulatory System, 17 J. LEGAL
STUD. 43, 52 (1988) [hereinafter Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion]; Schulhofer, Due Pro-
cess of Sentencing, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 733, 757-60 (1980); Westen & Westin, A Constitutional
Law of Remedies for Broken Plea Bargains, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 471, 498 n.101 (1978) (arguing
that a guilty plea should be held invalid if inducement of plea is so great that even an innocent
defendant would be likely to plead guilty).
95. Alschuler, The Prosecutor's Role in Plea Bargaining, 36 U. CHI. L. REV. 50, 60
(1968). Logical inference alone leads one to the conclusion that prosecutors will tend to offer
substantial sentencing differentials in weak cases, since it is rational risk avoidance behavior.
Alschuler provides anecdotal support for this proposition. Id. at 61-62. Others have provided
more systematically gathered empirical support. See Note, Guilty Plea Bargaining: Com-
promises by Prosecutors to Secure Guilty Pleas, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 865, 901 (1964) (authored
by Dominick R. Vetri).
96. Easterbrook, supra note 29, at 289. According to Easterbrook, plea bargaining, along
with prosecutorial discretion and discretionary sentencing, exhibit many of the features one
would expect in a market system geared to efficiently allowing achieving "the maximum deter-
rent punch out of whatever resources are committed to crime control." Id. at 290.
97. Id. at 297. The cost to the prosecutor is figured not in monetary terms, but in terms
of opportunity cost, "penalties that could be obtained in other cases by using the resources
released from settling the case at hand." Id.
[Vol. 40
DISCLOSURE IN THE GUILTY PLEA PROCESS
the probable penalty after trial. "As the sentence on conviction and the
probability of conviction rise, so does the prosecutor's minimum de-
mand."98 Obviously, then, as the sentence on conviction and the
probability of conviction fall, so does the prosecutor's minimum demand.
Thus, we should expect an inverse relationship between the strength of
the evidence and the strength of the inducement to plead: the weaker the
evidence, the greater the sentencing differential. 99 In short, "Easter-
brook's analysis provides powerful explanation for why a plea-bargaining
system, in the hands of a rational prosecutor, will generate extremely
strong inducements for defendants to waive trial and pronounce them-
selves guilty, whether they are guilty or not."'0
Brady cases by definition are ones in which evidence favorable to the
defendant exists. If such evidence relates to guilt, it weakens the prose-
cutor's case for trial. If the favorable evidence is of only marginal mate-
riality, the weakening may be insignificant. At the other extreme, if the
Brady material is totally exculpatory, then the strength of the case is
completely eviscerated. Under the Supreme Court's current definition of
materiality, evidence qualifies as Brady material if there is a reasonable
probability that it would change the outcome. 01 Any case in which
there exists evidence that creates a reasonable probability of nonconvic-
tion is by definition a weak case. All Brady cases under the current defi-
nition of materiality used by the Supreme Court, then, are by definition
weak cases, cases in which prosecutors will be prone to offer high sen-
tencing differentials. In short, Brady cases inherently present the risk
that Easterbrook's model illustrates. They tend to combine questionable
guilt with a strong inducement to self-condemnation.
Since a characteristic of Brady cases is the exclusive possession by
the prosecution of favorable information, Brady cases present a third fac-
tor that increases the risk of false self-condemnation: the defendant's ig-
norance of the weakness in the government's case. If the defendant is
unaware of the weakness in the government's case, he will overestimate
the chances for conviction. This inflated view of the risk in going to trial
should render the rational defendant much more prone to accepting a
plea offer than one who has an accurate picture of the major strengths
and weaknesses in the government's case. In short, the apparent risk
98. Id.
99. "The universal rule is that the sentence differential between guilty-plea and trial de-
fendants increases in direct proportion to the likelihood of acquittal." Alschuler, supra note
84, at 60 (footnote omitted); Note, supra note 22, at 1010; Comment, supra note 22, at 170.
100. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion, supra note 94, at 74.
101. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
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associated with trial based on a false overestimation of the government's
case due to lack of disclosure in turn leads to an inflated differential,
providing an inducement to plead guilty more powerful than would be
generated by a well-informed estimate of the government's case. 10 2 In
Brady cases, then, three factors will tend to converge: questionable guilt,
strong inducements to plead guilty in the form of high sentencing differ-
entials, and a defendant who overestimates the government's chances for
conviction. Convergence of these three factors significantly increases the
risk that innocent defendants will condemn themselves falsely.
The concern with false self-condemnation in weak cases may appear
more theoretical than practical. It may seem more realistic to expect the
prosecutor simply to dismiss these cases rather than plea bargain them.
Moreover, if the evidence is so weak that the prosecutor thinks convic-
tion improbable, is not probable cause lacking? 10 3 The prosecutor, after
all, ethically is required not to pursue cases if probable cause is lack-
ing.' °4 Aside from ethics, the prosecutor's interest in pursuing these
cases should diminish as the proof diminishes, leading the prosecutor to
dismiss or decline such cases because both conviction and guilt are too
uncertain. 1 0 5
Undoubtedly, many Brady cases are dismissed or declined as a re-
sult of the combined effects of questionable guilt, the Brady rule, the ethi-
cal requirements regarding probable cause, and the low chance of
102. "A criminal defendant's decision to plead guilty reflects his assessment of the
strength of the state's case against him. The prosecution's failure to disclose evidence
favorable to the defendant skews that calculation." Note, supra note 22, at 1004. "Nondisclo-
sure during plea bargaining creates a real threat of inaccurate results by eroding the defend-
ant's bargaining position. Because a defendant's bargaining power depends on his knowledge
of the evidence in the state's possession, suppression of exculpatory evidence reduces this
power." Id. at 1014.
103. Courts vary on the definition of probable cause applicable to the initiation of criminal
proceedings. Some have equated it with the probable cause standard applied under the fourth
amendment. Others have equated it with the much more stringent standard used for deciding
a motion for acquittal at trial. Others have defined it as somewhere between these two. Y.
Kamisar, W. LaFave & J. Israel, supra note 4, at 953-54.
104. "A public prosecutor.., shall not institute or cause to be instituted criminal charges
when he knows or it is obvious that the charges are not supported by probable cause." MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(A) (1981). The prosecutor in a criminal
case shall "refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by
probable cause." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8(a) (1987).
105. Declination and dismissal simply refer to the two means by which a prosecutor exe-
cutes a decision not to prosecute a case. When a prosecutor decides to forego prosecution
before any charges have been filed, the case is simply declined. If charges have been filed,
implementation of the decision to forego prosecution requires dismissal of pending charges
under a rule such as FED. R. CRIM. P. 4 8(a).
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conviction at trial. 106 In cases in which the Brady material is totally ex-
culpatory,10 7 for example, a prosecutor usually will have no interest in
pursuing prosecution of the defendant.
There are countervailing factors, however, which may incline the
prosecutor against dismissal or declination in particular cases. An as-
sumption that all Brady cases will be not be prosecuted would be seri-
ously deficient in failing to take these factors into account. Pressures
extrinsic to the particular case, such as political or publicity concerns,
may influence some prosecutors to continue prosecution. If the defend-
ant has some contact with other criminal activity, other pressures may be
generated. For instance, if the defendant, though innocent of the
charged crime, has information or knowledge about other crimes that the
prosecutor needs, the prosecutor may feel pressure to continue the prose-
cution for leverage in gaining the defendant's cooperation. Or the de-
fendant himself, though innocent of the charged crime, may be
unsympathetic. He may have a bad criminal record. He may be sus-
pected of other crimes by investigating authorities. Or the prosecutor
may in fact have proof that the defendant has committed other crimes
but be unable to obtain a conviction because of a legal impediment to
prosecution unrelated to guilt, such as a fourth amendment violation. In
short, prosecuting authorities may view the defendant as a "bad actor"
against whom they are seeking some basis for conviction, and thus be
reluctant to dismiss.108
The most troublesome Brady cases, though, are those in which the
Brady material is not totally exculpatory. 109 They may tempt the prose-
cutor most to resolve the case by guilty plea rather than terminiting the
106. Commentators disagree on the amount of bluffing engaged in by prosecutors to obtain
guilty pleas in weak cases. Compare Alschuler, supra note 95 (claiming that such bluffing is
widespread), with McDonald, Cramer & Rossman, Prosecutorial Bluffing, supra note 23 (dis-
puting Alschuler's claim and finding that although some bluffing does occur, the practice is
neither widespread nor unscrupulous).
107. An example of totally exculpatory Brady material would be a DNA or blood group-
ing test of a semen sample from the victim in a rape case that positively excluded the defendant
as the rapist.
108. See F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A SUSPECT WITH A
CRIME 287-92 (1969). In deciding to prosecute a particular defendant, among the factors that
"may make officials especially anxious to 'put him away' for a long time" are "his criminal
record, noncriminal conduct bearing on his 'character,' official suspicion of the commission of
offenses which they cannot prove, or connection of the suspect with a professional criminal or
with syndicated criminalism." Id. at 287.
109. An example of Brady material that is less than totally exculpatory would be a state-
ment by a key witness casting serious doubt on the witness' credibility, such as the statement of
uncertainty regarding identification made by the robbery victim to the prosecutor in the intro-
ductory hypothetical.
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prosecution. In such a case, the prosecutor, though unable to prove guilt
at trial, may be unconvinced of the defendant's innocence. If the crime is
a serious one, the prosecutor may be particularly reluctant to dismiss
charges against someone who may in fact be guilty. The prosecutor may
also assume, as the Supreme Court does, that no innocent defendant
would plead guilty. 110 She thus may feel that she has ascertained the
truth if the defendant has pleaded guilty and admitted the crime. The
prosecutor's attempt to secure a guilty plea in this way may seem morally
acceptable when compared with the risk of freeing a defendant who may
be guilty and dangerous. The introductory armed robbery hypothetical
confronts the prosecutor with this sort of case. In that hypothetical, the
prosecutor might feel, for example, that the witness' uncertainty is due to
fear rather than a true mistaken identification.
It would be difficult, if not impossible, to determine the exact per-
centage of Brady cases declined or dismissed. How do we know, then,
that enough Brady cases stay in the system to merit constitutional con-
cern over their fate in the guilty plea process? The answer is provided by
the Brady rule itself. If we were to assume that all Brady cases would be
dismissed or declined, we would need no Brady rule at all. The very
existence of the Brady rule reflects the view that some percentage of
Brady cases will continue to be prosecuted. This view may simply reflect
a realistic appraisal of the many complex countervailing forces that oper-
ate on the resolution of Brady cases or a practical assessment that not all
prosecutors are virtuous. Or it may be based on the theoretical premise
that due process exists quite apart from the requirements of ethics or
empirical assessments about the frequency of certain types of
prosecutorial behavior. The very existence of the Brady rule, though,
clearly attests to the fact that Brady cases that are prosecuted rather than
dismissed or declined are a matter of constitutional concern. It is the
resolution of these cases that remain in the prosecutorial system with
which this article is concerned.
(3) Safeguarding the Sincerity of Self-Condemnation: Brady Disclosure as a
Check on the Inducement to False Self-Condemnation
We now turn to the issue of how mandatory disclosure of Brady
material in the guilty plea process would affect the convergence of weak
proof of guilt, powerful sentencing differentials, and uninformed defend-
ants. Our analysis so far has led to the conclusion that the prosecutor
110. See, e.g., M. HEUMANN, PLEA BARGAINING: THE EXPERIENCES OF PROSECUTORS,
JUDGES, AND DEFENSE ATTORNEYS 122-23 (1978) ("Veteran prosecutors scoff at the notion
that plea bargaining coerces innocent defendants to plead guilty.").
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will tend to prefer plea bargaining and to offer high sentencing differen-
tials in weak cases. We should expect then, that Brady cases regularly
will tend to be resolved by plea negotiation rather than trial through the
use of high sentencing differentials. This would be true regardless of the
existence of the Brady rule. We should expect a significant sentencing
differential in a case in which Brady material exists even without a rule of
mandatory disclosure at trial. A prosecutor might well decide to offer an
attractive plea with a significant differential simply to avoid the risk of
the defendant finding the exculpatory information on his own, particu-
larly since the chances of such discovery are heightened by the trial and
appeal process and the continued preparation, investigation, and involve-
ment of counsel the process entails.
The Brady rule, by requiring the prosecutor to disclose at trial, con-
verts the risk that a defendant might discover the exculpatory informa-
tion at trial into a virtual certainty, the only alternative at trial being the
commission of clear constitutional and ethical violations. Once the infor-
mation is disclosed, the prosecutor's chances for losing at trial are some-
where between reasonably probable and certain, depending on how
exculpatory the evidence is. Faced with such a prospect, the rational
prosecutor's most likely choice is either to dismiss or to offer a plea. If
she takes the plea route, her incentive to offer a high sentencing differen-
tial is greatly increased by the fact that the Brady rule operates at trial.
Again, the Easterbrook model provides an excellent means for illus-
trating this tendency. With the Brady rule requiring disclosure at trial,
in Easterbrook's terminology the expected return of going to trial is very
low since the probability of conviction at trial is very low, possibly even
zero, if the Brady material is totally exculpatory. This gives the prosecu-
tor only one realistic choice other than dismissal, which is to try to ob-
tain some penalty through a guilty plea. If the defendant is resistant, the
rational prosecutor should drop her minimum settlement demand.
Faced with the alternative of getting nothing or close to nothing at trial,
the prosecutor will have virtually no theoretical limit on her willingness
to reduce her plea offer by increasing the sentencing differential. The
only theoretical limit should be the point at which the defendant accepts
the offer.11'
One would expect the rational prosecutor who encounters a case
with Brady material and faces a mandatory disclosure rule in the trial
context, but not in the plea context, never to take it to trial. Thus, the
11I. There may, of course, be practical limitations on the prosecutor's ability to lower her
offer, such as internal guidelines of the prosecutor's office setting limits on plea bargaining.
July 1989]
Brady rule, if applied only in the trial context, would have the ironic
result not of compelling disclosure, but of steering Brady cases into the
guilty plea context for resolution without disclosure. Thus, the cases the
rule was intended to regulate would not come within the reach of the
rule, the trial context. In the terminology of Professors Mnookin and
Komhauser, the "shadow" of a Brady rule restricted only to trials would
keep Brady cases out of the trial context and increase the pressure of the
sentencing differential in such cases in the guilty plea context." 12
In sum, we should expect restriction of the disclosure rule to trials
to have two direct consequences. First, it should increase the incentive of
a rational prosecutor to avoid trial in order to avoid the Brady disclosure
rule, by choosing plea bargaining over trial as a means for resolving
Brady cases not declined or dismissed. Second, it should increase the
incentive of a rational prosecutor in such cases to offer inducements to
plead guilty so substantial that the plea will be very attractive to the
defendant whether innocent or guilty. Consequently, if plea negotiations
took place in the shadow of a disclosure rule restricted to trials, the likeli-
hood in the plea negotiation process of the convergence of three factors
would increase substantially: questionable guilt, a very strong induce-
ment to plead guilty in the form of a high sentencing differential, and a
defendant uninformed of a major weakness in the prosecution's case.
Convergence of these three factors significantly increases the risk of inno-
cent defendants falsely condemning themselves in Brady cases and thus
threatens the accuracy of the plea. This risk is inherent in all Brady
cases.
Brady disclosure in the guilty plea process could help remedy the
problem of this convergence. It would decrease the risk to accuracy
posed by these cases by informing the defendant of the major weaknesses
in the prosecution's case. Such disclosure would allow the defendant to
calculate more accurately the risk of going to trial and would lower his
estimation of the risks associated with trial. As the estimated risk at trial
decreases, so does the perceived value of the prosecutor's plea offer and
the inducement to false self-condemnation. In sum, the disclosure would
provide a means of checking the power of the inducement to false self-
condemnation that such cases will tend to generate. Finally, it should be
noted that while Brady disclosure would help remedy the problem of
insincerity undermining the accuracy of a guilty plea confession, it would
not guarantee the accuracy of a guilty plea confession any more than
Brady disclosure at trial guarantees the accuracy of a jury verdict. Brady
112. See Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 80, at 951.
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disclosure, in short, would not cure completely the problem of high sen-
tencing differentials interacting with weak cases. This fact is an impor-
tant qualification to the accuracy claims advanced above. If the
prosecutor discloses Brady material in the guilty plea process, a highly
risk adverse defendant may still wish to plead guilty even knowing the
existence of the Brady material.11 3 Application of Brady to guilty pleas,
however, should work to encourage a significant number of cases in
which the defendant would have agreed to plead guilty to be dismissed
outright or resolved by trial." 4
A more abstract way of assessing the value of disclosure in the guilty
plea process is from the point of view of the incentives disclosure rules
create for prosecutors. A criminal justice system that condemns conceal-
ment of Brady material as a due process violation at trial, but not in plea
bargaining, essentially encourages prosecutors to divert Brady cases into
plea bargaining. The main point of the argument in this section is that
the possible inaccuracy of plea bargaining in such cases renders such an
incentive system seriously flawed.
C. The Potential Costs of Disclosure
In the preceding two sections, the claim has been advanced that dis-
closure of Brady material in the guilty plea context would promote the
accuracy of guilty pleas by helping to ensure the knowledge and sincerity
of the admission of guilt, which is the foundation of the guilty plea.
There are several counter-arguments to a rule of mandatory disclosure:
conviction of guilty defendants will be hindered; the search for exculpa-
tory information by police and prosecutors will be discouraged; and po-
lice will be reluctant to share exculapatory information with prosecutors.
113. If the Brady material is totally exculpatory, there is little if any chance of the defend-
ant pleading guilty. Once the prosecutor has decided to reveal totally exculpatory evidence,
most likely the case will be dismissed. Even if the case were not dismissed, the defendant
should resist a guilty plea since acquittal is virtually certain at trial. If the Brady material is
less than totally exculpatory, however, the likelihood of the prosecutor or judge dismissing the
case, while still great, is lessened. If the case is not dismissed, the prosecutor simply may
increase the sentencing differential to compensate for the weakening of the case caused by the
disclosure. In our introductory hypothetical, for example, even if the defendant knows that
the only key witness cannot identify him, if the prosecutor makes the sentencing differential
great enough-for example straight probation-the innocent defendant may still plead guilty
to avoid even the very small chance of a conviction and jail sentence after trial.
114. It has been argued that trial is a better mechanism for accurately resolving questions
of doubtful guilt. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion, supra note 94, at 74-77. It also
could be argued that trial is a morally superior way to handle cases of questionable guilt since
the full panoply of constitutional safeguards would have been devoted to protecting the de-
fendant compared with the reduced number of safeguards present with a guilty plea.
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1. Guilty Defendants
One argument is that in some cases disclosure will hinder the con-
viction of guilty defendants. When the Brady material is totally exculpa-
tory, disclosure serves to protect the innocent with no disservice to the
goal of convicting the guilty. But when the Brady material is less than
totally exculpatory, disclosure may be at the cost of not convicting some
guilty defendants. Turning to the robbery hypothetical with which we
began, even though the victim apparently thinks he has identified the
wrong person, the defendant may still in fact be guilty. This uncertainty
about guilt or innocence is the very reason why the prosecutor hesitates
to dismiss such a case, as mentioned previously. If the defendant is in
fact guilty, forcing the government to disclose Brady material in the
guilty plea process reduces the prosecutor's ability to bluff a guilty de-
fendant into pleading guilty.
This problem reveals a tension between two different goals of the
truth determining function of the criminal process: maximizing protec-
tion of innocent defendants from conviction and maximizing the convic-
tion of guilty defendants. With perfect information, there would exist no
tension between these two goals. But with imperfect information, protec-
tion of the innocent and the conviction of the guilty are frequently in
conflict.
If Brady disclosure in the guilty plea process protects the innocent
from false conviction at the cost of allowing some guilty defendants to
escape punishment, then mandating Brady disclosure in the guilty plea
process requires some rationale for preferring protection of innocent de-
fendants. A powerful reason for such a preference is found in a value
fundamental to our criminal justice system and implicit in the constitu-
tional Brady rule. As expressed by Justice Harlan: "In a criminal case
... we do not view the social disutility of convicting an innocent man as
equivalent to the disutility of acquitting someone who is guilty .... In
this context, I view the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
in a criminal case as bottomed on a fundamental value determination of
our society that it is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a
guilty man go free."' 15
The Brady rule in the trial context reflects the value judgment, ex-
pressed by Justice Harlan, that the utility of protecting the innocent from
punishment should be given much greater weight than "the disutility of
acquitting someone who is guilty." If the case in the introductory rob-
bery hypothetical, for example, went to trial, the Brady rule would ad-
115. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J. concurring).
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vance the accuracy of the jury's verdict by helping assure that the jury
hears the exculpatory information, even though the most likely result of
disclosure at trial would be the acquittal of a defendant who still might
be guilty. Similarly, we should prefer the utility of Brady disclosure in
the guilty plea process over its disutility in the loss of convictions of the
guilty. Unless a procedural mechanism, whether at trial or during plea
negotiations, provides a high degree of assurance that it protects the in-
nocent from conviction, we should reject it even at the risk of freeing a
guilty defendant.
2. Production and Sharing of Exculpatory Information
The advantages of disclosure must also be weighed against two dif-
ferent sorts of disutilities. The first is that a mandatory disclosure rule
would hinder investigations leading to exculpatory information. In
short, both police and prosecutors may be less likely to produce exculpa-
tory information if required to reveal it to criminal defendants pleading
guilty." 6 Second, even if the police find exculpatory information, they
will be less likely to share it with prosecutors bound by a mandatory
disclosure rule. The beneficial effects claimed for disclosure in the previ-
ous sections would then be reduced or nullified both by less thorough
investigation and restricted access for the prosecutor to whatever excul-
patory information is produced. If exculpatory information is not pro-
duced or shared with the prosecutor, she simply will be unable to reveal
it. Moreover, other benefits of the prosecutor's access to exculpatory in-
formation-primarily the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to dismiss
the case-will be lost. In other words, the accuracy of the criminal jus-
tice system is best served by creating the maximum incentives for thor-
ough investigation and complete revelation to the prosecutor.
These arguments reveal the "tension between creating incentives to
create new information and obtaining the optimal use of existing infor-
mation" 17 found in such diverse areas as patents, copyrights, evidentiary
privileges, and insider trading. So far our analysis has focused on the use
116. In some contexts, such as civil discovery, the "production" of information refers to
turning information over or making it available for copying and inspection by someone else.
See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 34 (Production of Documents and Things). As the term is used in
the text of this Article, however, it refers to a search which results in either the gathering of
existing information or the creation of new information. The police looking for and finding the
testimony of an eyewitness to a crime is an example of production through gathering existing
information. The performance of scientific tests on blood or fibers is an example of production
through the creation of new information.
117. Easterbrook, Insider Trading, Secret Agents, Evidentiary Privileges, and the Produc-
tion of Information, Sup. CT. REv. 309, 313 (1981).
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aspect of disclosure, the advantages to be gained in accuracy by making
exculpatory information available to defendants pleading guilty. Now
we must examine the creation and access aspects of disclosure to deter-
mine whether the advantages of extending a mandatory disclosure rule
from the trial context to the guilty plea context should be preferred to
any costs incurred through a reduced incentive to produce and share ex-
culpatory information.' 18
a. Production
It might be argued that police would be less likely to create exculpa-
tory evidence by running a DNA or blood grouping test on a semen sam-
ple in a rape case, for example, if they knew that an exculpatory result
had to be disclosed in plea bargaining. Similarly, the prosecutor would
be less likely in interviewing witnesses to seek out exculpatory inconsis-
tencies if she had to disclose the results in plea bargaining.
This argument is well developed in the law and economics literature.
Professor Kronman, for example, argues that economic analysis leads to
a nondisclosure rule for "deliberately acquired information" in order to
maximize the incentive to acquire such information." 9 However, disclo-
sure would be required for "casually acquired information," which is not
the product of deliberate search but the by-product of other activity. 20
Kronman's distinction between deliberately and casually acquired infor-
mation provides a useful means for analyzing the potential costs of ex-
tending Brady to guilty pleas.
First, much Brady material is not the product of a search by the
police or prosecutors. For example, in the entrapment hypothetical dis-
cussed earlier, 12 the fact that a particular person is acting as an agent of
the government in enticing someone to sell drugs is not the result of a
118. The sincerity claim set forth previously takes as an assumption that the Brady rule
and ethical disclosure rules exist in the trial context. One could appropriately focus the crea-
tion/access arguments advanced in the text on the Brady trial rule and reexamine it in light of
these arguments. But the question this Article addresses is a narrower one: accepting the
Brady rule in the trial context, should it be extended to guilty plea negotiations as well. Hence,
the creation/access arguments need to be precisely focused on the question of the disincentives
created by extension of Brady to the guilty plea context. The Brady trial rule already creates a
disincentive for the creation of and access to exculpatory information. Since this Article ar-
gues for extension of Brady disclosure to the guilty plea context, the real question here is the
marginal increase in disincentive versus the marginal increase in accuracy resulting from such
an extension of disclosure.
119. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL
STUD. 1, 2 (1978).
120. Id.
121. See'supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
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search, but rather simply a by-product of the government's use of infor-
mants. Similarly, exculpatory information in the form of a promise or
concession to a witness, such as a reduction in sentence in return for
testimony, is not produced or created by a search for such information.
This information is simply a by-product of the government's use of
promises or concessions to gain the cooperation of witnesses. Clearly,
this Brady material would qualify as "casually acquired" and thus
should be subject to disclosure, since the information will still be gener-
ated regardless of a disclosure rule.
Second, when exculpatory information is the product of a search-
such as a DNA test on a semen sample-the search for the exculpatory
information is difficult if not impossible to segregate from the search for
incriminating evidence. Thus, much Brady material will tend to be gen-
erated as a by-product of the prosecution's pursuit of its own self-interest
in finding incriminating evidence. Again, this Brady material would
qualify for disclosure as a "casually acquired" by product of another ac-
tivity-the search for incriminating evidence.
Third, when the search for exculpatory information can be segre-
gated from the search for incriminating information, there are a number
of powerful incentives that push the prosecutor and the police to con-
tinue to search for this information. First, the police and the prosecutor
have an obvious interest in knowing if the defendant is innocent espe-
cially in the early stages of an investigation, either because they are moti-
vated to discover the truth or because they want to avoid wasting
investigative time and resources in pursuing the wrong suspect. Once the
prosecution and police have committed themselves to the prosecution of
a particular defendant, these incentives become much weaker, in part
because the police and prosecutors will have made a psychological com-
mitment to their belief in the defendant's guilt. At this later stage, how-
ever, the police and prosecutors still have a strategic interest in learning
the weaknesses of their case so that they may most effectively either cure
them before trial or know whether the case should be dismissed or
pleaded out, unless they are positive the defense cannot find the informa-
tion. Again, exculpatory information is generated as a by-product of the
police and prosecution's self-interested pursuit of conviction of a guilty
person. Much, perhaps most, of Brady material will be "casually ac-
quired information" in Kronman's terminology 22 and thus qualify for
122. Ironically, the need for Brady disclosure, set forth in Section II(B)(3), supra, as a
check on the powerful inducements to false self-condemnation which Brady cases naturally
tend to generate, would be greatly reduced if the police were to withhold the exculpatory
information from the prosecutor. As demonstrated in Section II(B), the threat to sincerity is
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disclosure without significantly damaging the search for exculpatory
information.
b. Sharing
A second and perhaps more important problem is that the police
may not share the exculpatory information they do find with the prosecu-
tor if she is required to disclose. Here, the value of the disclosure rule
could be nullified if the prosecutor were denied access to the very infor-
mation to be disclosed. The fear is that the disclosure rule would bring
about precisely the situation found in the Supreme Court's most recent
Brady case, in which the investigating agents entered into agreements to
pay the prosecution's two main witnesses for their undercover investiga-
tive work and testimony, but never informed the prosecutor of these
facts. 12 3
This argument is well developed in the area of attorney-client confi-
dentiality and evidentiary privilege. 124 In his treatment of the defense
attorney's handling of perjury, for example, Monroe Freedman has ar-
gued that a mandatory disclosure rule requiring a defense lawyer to use
information about client perjury to the client's disadvantage often will
assure that the client simply will not disclose the fact that he has commit-
ted or intends to commit perjury. Thus, attorneys will be "ignorant of
the perjury and therefore will be in no position to attempt to discourage
the client from presenting it. ' ' 125
There are a number of responses to this argument, the weight of
which ultimately compel adoption of a disclosure rule. First, much im-
portant Brady material is generated in such a way that it cannot be hid-
den from the prosecutor. Many agreements with informants or other
cooperating witnesses, unlike the agreements in the Bagley case, require
largely a product of the large sentencing differential which will tend to be generated by a
rational prosecutor aware of a major weakness in the case. If the prosecutor is uninformed of
the weakness, she should not be driven to offer the kind of sentencing differential which we
have identified as one of the key ingredients undermining the accuracy of a defendant's guilty
plea in a Brady case.
123. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 671, n.4 (1985) (The government's two main
trial witnesses had entered into agreements with the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms
for payment of $300 each in return for undercover gathering of evidence and testifying in
court. "The Assistant United States Attorney who prosecuted respondent stated in stipulated
testimony that he had not known that the contracts existed and that he would have furnished
them to respondent had he known of them.").
124. See, e.g., Saltzburg, Principles and Professionals: Lawyers and Psychiatrists, 66 VA. L.
REV. 597, 603-12 (1980).
125. Freedman, Professional Responsibility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: the Three
Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469, 1476 (1966).
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the prosecutor's involvement in terms of a sentencing recommendation
or reduction or dismissal of charges. Other Brady material, such as prior
statements by witnesses, is generated during the prosecutor's interview-
ing of a witness, as in our first hypothetical.
Clearly, though, there is a substantial amount of exculpatory evi-
dence, such as a lab report or the existence of an exculpatory witness or
piece of evidence, that the prosecutor will know of only if the police in-
form the prosecutor of its existence. The inclination of investigating
agents to hide such evidence in order to avoid disclosure by the prosecu-
tor is subject to a number of conflicting incentives. Without question, a
mandatory disclosure rule in plea bargaining creates a disincentive for
sharing exculpatory information with the prosecutor. Just as in the area
of production of exculpatory information discussed in the preceding sec-
tion, however, there exist a number of counter-incentives prompting the
police to share the exculpatory material with the prosecutor in spite of
the disclosure rule.
First, the police have an incentive to disclose to the prosecutor in
order to avoid convicting the wrong person and to refocus both their own
and the prosecutor's resources in pursuing other suspects. Second, the
police have an incentive to reveal evidentiary weaknesses so that the
prosecutor may be able to take steps to minimize the damage caused to
the case or negotiate a guilty plea, especially if they feel that the informa-
tion may be found by the defense. The rational police officer, like the
rational prosecutor, is likely to want to resolve weak cases through the
use of a guilty plea. This normally will entail sharing the evidentiary
weakness that dictates negotiation of a guilty plea with the prosecutor.
Another factor influencing the incentive to conceal exculpatory informa-
tion from the prosecutor is the degree of openness and cooperation be-
tween the particular investigative agency and the prosecutor's office.
A final and important counter-incentive to hiding the exculpatory
information from the prosecutor arises from the risks entailed if the in-
vestigating agent's failure to share the information with the prosecutor is
discovered. This counter-incentive is a function of the risk and conse-
quences of detection. 126 The risk of detection increases with the number
of people involved in the investigation who know of the exculpatory in-
formation. 127 The existence of statutes such as the Freedom of Informa-
tion Act, 128 which can open investigative files for later scrutiny by the
defendant, also increase the risk of detection. The active and early in-
126. See K. Scheppele, LEGAL SECRETS 48-53 (1988).
127. Id at 49-50.
128. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982).
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volvement of the prosecutor in the investigative phase of the case, as
when a grand jury is used in the investigation, similarly increases the risk
of detection.
The consequences of detection may range from violation of the in-
vestigating agency's own rules for providing information to the prosecu-
tor to actual retaliation by the prosecutor's office. Unlike the
relationship between the typical criminal defendant and his lawyer, the
police and the prosecutor's office normally have a continuing relation-
ship. Thus, the prosecutor may have either formal means of retaliating,
such as a complaint to the investigating agent's superiors, or informal
means through withholding cooperation in the investigation or prosecu-
tion of future cases.1 29
Ultimately, though, as with the disutility of the loss of convictions of
guilty defendants, we must face the question of why we should prefer the
utility of disclosure in helping ensure knowledge and sincerity over the
utility of maximizing incentives for the production and sharing of excul-
patory information. Preference for the utility of disclosure could be
based on a conclusion that the gains in accuracy of the guilty plea pro-
cess will exceed the costs in exculpatory information not sought out or
shared with the prosecutor because of the number and strength of the
incentives to produce and share exculpatory information in spite of a
mandatory disclosure rule. The analysis set forth above, regarding pro-
duction of exculpatory information indicates strong support for this
judgment. In regard to the police sharing the information with the pros-
ecutor, the balance between the benefits and costs seems to be a closer
one. In either case, though, the questions presented are difficult if not
impossible to resolve empirically. 130
Finally, though, a value judgment implicit in the very existence of
the Brady rule provides a powerful argument for resolving in favor of
disclosure the tension between the utility of disclosure and the disutility
of reduced incentives for creation of and access to exculpatory informa-
tion. The Brady rule exists in the trial context as a matter of constitu-
tional imperative despite the fact that its existence creates precisely these
types of creation and access disincentives. Although the Brady cases do
129. See K. Scheppele, supra note 126, at 51-52.
130. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 117 at 361, 364 (in reference to a similar tension in
the area of attorney-client privilege, Judge Easterbrook has stated that tracing the web of the
effects of privileges in litigation "is a stupefying complex task. Economists (including the game
theorists) have only begun to grapple with the problems of creating and using information in
litigation." Id. at 361. "The analysis of information problems is difficult, and answers are
elusive; much depends on empirical work that is undone or undoable." Id. at 364.)
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not explicitly discuss this tension, a preference for the utility of disclosure
is implicit in the very existence of the rule.131
II. Implementing Brady Disclosure in the Guilty Plea Process
The benefits of disclosure of Brady material in the guilty plea pro-
cess demonstrated in section II might be implemented with varying de-
grees of effectiveness through three means: a constitutional, ethical, or
statutory rule. A constitutional rule would likely be the most effective of
these for several reasons. First, a constitutional rule based in due process
would be applied uniformly to both federal and state prosecutions, as is
the present Brady trial rule. Statutory criminal procedure and ethical
rules, by contrast, are enacted jurisdiction by jurisdiction and conse-
quently are subject to lack of uniformity. Second, a constitutional rule
may have greater deterrent value as well. Prosecutors may take it more
seriously due simply to the symbolic stature of a constitutional rule.
Apart from symbolism, a constitutional rule may have a greater effect
because the violation of a constitutional rule tends to have greater reme-
dial significance in post-conviction review than statutory or ethical viola-
tions. For example, only constitutional violations are cognizable under
the federal habeas corpus remedy for review of state convictions. 13 2 Un-
like a constitutional violation, the remedies for an ethical violation, even
on direct appeal, may not include reversal of a conviction. Rather, the
primary sanction may be referral to the state bar for disciplinary pro-
ceedings,133 a remedy that, according to many commentators, is seldom
13 1. A number of possible rationales might explain the preference expressed in the Brady
rule for disclosure. First, it might simply be a result of a normative preference for openness on
the part of prosecutors and police, the sort of value reflected in the Freedom of Information
Act. Another possible rationale for the preference for Brady rule's disclosure might be based
on the superior access to such information which the prosecution and police frequently have.
In the area of discovery, "the defendant's right of discovery is said to be particularly strong
with respect to evidence that is peculiarly within the control of the prosecution and not other-
wise available to the defense." Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REv. 71,
124 n.251 (1973). Superior access to information in other contexts has frequently led to disclo-
sure requirements. See K. SCHEPPELE, supra note 126 at 134-38. Indeed, even Professor
Kronman's economic analysis leads him to the conclusion that efficiency requires disclosure
even of deliberately acquired information by a party who has superior access. Kronman, supra
note 119 at 4 ("a court concerned with economic efficiency should impose the risk on the
better information-gatherer.").
132. 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (1976).
133. See, e.g., United States v. Page, 828 F.2d 1476, 1480 (10th Cir. 1987) ("If the prose-
cutor in fact has violated ethical or legal canons in his discharge of Brady obligations, the
proper remedy is a disciplinary action against him, rather than a new trial for the defendant.");
People v. Jones, 44 N.Y.2d 76, 89 n.*, 375 N.E.2d 41, 44 n.*, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 846 (1978)
("Reference to [the Model Code of Professional Responsibility standard on prosecutorial dis-
closure of exculpatory evidence] should not be taken to imply that sanction for violation of
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effectively invoked against prosecutors. 134 Having in mind some of the
advantages and disadvantages of each mode of implementation, we now
turn to the particulars of implementing Brady disclosure through each of
these mechanisms.
A. Brady Disclosure as Due Process in Pleading Guilty
Section II of this Article advances instrumental arguments for dis-
closure of Brady material in the guilty plea process: such disclosure
would be useful in advancing the accuracy of guilty pleas by enhancing
both the defendant's knowledge and sincerity in confessing guilt. In
turning now to the issue of constitutional recognition for such a rule, a
primary concern is what if any weight should be accorded such argu-
ments in constitutional analysis. The instrumental value of a rule obvi-
ously does not mandate constitutional recognition for that rule. A rule's
utility may simply warrant its adoption as a statute or rule, such as the
many Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that exist as useful rules
without constitutional status. 135 Although instrumental reasoning re-
lated to accuracy of process has featured prominently in the development
of criminal due process, 136 the arguments in the following sections are
not based on the assumption that instrumental reasoning and constitu-
tional imperative can necessarily be equated. 137 Rather, as the following
professional responsibilities on the part of a prosecutor would necessarily inure to the benefit of
a defendant. The appropriate remedy might be limited to disciplinary proceedings. In any
event, we now express no view on this aspect of the matter.").
134. See, e.g., C. WOLFRAM, supra note 40, § 13.10.2, at 761 (1986) ("One finds, however,
that prosecutors are relatively rarely subjected to professional discipline. That probably does
not reflect uniformly superior conduct as compared with defense counsel or lawyers in other
roles. Instead, disciplinary agencies are probably reluctant to pursue complaints against prose-
cutors that may be motivated by resentment at convictions or that might be politically moti-
vated by a desire to compromise the political power of the prosecutor's office."); N. DORSEN &
L. FRIEDMAN, DISORDER IN COURT 187 (1973); Alschuler, Courtroom Misconduct By Prose-
cutors and Trial Judges, 50 TEX. L. REV. 629, 670-75 (1972). In relation to violations of the
ethical disclosure rules that parallel the Brady trial rule, such disciplinary proceedings have
been rare. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against Prosecutors For Brady Violations: A Paper
Tiger, 65 N.C.L. REV. 693, 730-31 (1987).
135. "It must be recognized that constitutional rules represent only the minimum protec-
tions that must be afforded criminal defendants. Statutes and court rules can and do build
upon or add to constitutional minima and fill out the interstices of the criminal justice pro-
cess." S. SALTZBURG, supra note 4, at 4.
136. See Kadish, supra note 35, at 346 (One of the traditional objectives of due process "is
the goal of insuring the reliability of the guilt-determining process-reducing to a minimum
the possibility that any innocent individual will be punished.").
137. On the place of instrumental reasoning in constitutional analysis, see the following
exchange between Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor Laurence Tribe. Tribe, Constitu-
tional Calculus: Equal Justice or Economic Efficiency, 98 HARV. L. REV. 592 (1985); Easter-
brook, Method, Result, and Authority: A Reply, 98 HARV. L. REV. 622 (1985).
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sections make clear, they are based in part on the prominence of instru-
mental reasoning related to accuracy in the areas of constitutional doc-
trine most relevant to the disclosure question this Article addresses.
The Supreme Court's restrictive attitude toward the Brady rule in
recent years initially suggests that the Court would be unreceptive to the
idea of expanding the rule's applicability to a new context. But the em-
phasis in many criminal procedure opinions of both the Burger and
Rehnquist Courts on the central importance of accurate determination of
the question of factual guilt in the criminal process indicates that the
present Court might be receptive to a rationale premised on advancing
accuracy in the guilty plea process. 138 The very ground used for narrow-
ing the rule in other contexts may serve to help it gain recognition in the
guilty plea context.
Two lines of Supreme Court authority are most relevant to the issue
of Brady's application to guilty pleas: cases dealing with the Brady doc-
trine and cases dealing with guilty pleas. Opinions in both these areas
articulate a high value on accuracy, echoing the more general theme of
the ascendancy of accuracy in the Supreme Court's stated hierarchy of
values. This emphasis on accuracy may beckon us to an overly optimis-
tic prediction of the Court's receptiveness to the accuracy argument ad-
vanced in the preceding section. Certain facets of Supreme Court
doctrine in both the Brady rule and guilty plea areas dictate at best a
qualified optimism about the prospects for recognition of a right to Brady
disclosure in the guilty plea process. Although exhaustive treatment of
the Court's approach to Brady and to guilty pleas is beyond the scope of
this Article, this section evaluates the amenability of Supreme Court doc-
trine in each of these areas to an accuracy rationale for the application of
the Brady rule as a due process requirement for guilty pleas.
138. See, eg., Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681 (1986) ("The harmless-error
doctrine recognizes the principle that the central purpose of a criminal trial is to decide the
factual question of the defendant's guilt or innocence."); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 490
(1976) ("the ultimate question of guilt or innocence ... should be the central concern in a
criminal proceeding"). The analytical focus of recent criminal procedure opinions on the cen-
trality of factual guilt has drawn significant scholarly attention. See, e.g., C. WHITEBREAD &
C. SLOBOGIN, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 3-5 (1986); Saltzburg, Foreword: The Flow and Ebb of
Constitutional Procedure in the Warren and Burger Courts, 69 GEO. L.J. 151, 154-58 (1980);
Seidman, Factual Guilt and the Burger Court: An Examination of Continuity and Change in
Criminal Procedure, 80 COLUM. L. REv. 436, 456-83 (1980); Stacy & Dayton, Rethinking
Harmless Constitutional Error, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 79, 79-88 (1988). Some commentators see
this analytic focus as representing a true commitment to advancing the value of factual accu-
racy. Other commentators, while noting the preoccupation of recent Supreme Court opinions
with factual guilt, claim that the court's devotion to it is little more than rhetorical. See Seid-
man, supra, at 483.
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(1) Brady Doctrine
Justice Douglas' opinion in the original Brady case provided sparse
explanation of the constitutional foundation of the Brady rule, other than
noting that it was based on due process. The opinion treats the case as
simply an extension of existing precedent rather than the creation of a
major new rule.1 39 Nonetheless, the creation and development of the
Brady doctrine have been marked by three recurring themes, which pro-
vide some guidance to the rule's constitutional bases. The first and domi-
nant theme is that the rule is concerned primarily with evidence that is
outcome determinative and that bears on factual accuracy. A secondary
theme is that of giving expression to a special obligation of the prosecutor
to justice. A final and minor theme is protection of the criminal process
from the corrupting effect of perjury. The following section demon-
strates that the current Brady doctrine, based on a commingling of three
different themes, should prove receptive to an accuracy rationale for dis-
closure in the guilty plea process.
a. The Outcome Determinative Requirement
The most conspicuous aspect of current Brady doctrine is its virtu-
ally exclusive concern with the outcome of the criminal proceeding. The
Supreme Court's treatment of materiality is the clearest expression of
this concern. The Court's most recent Brady case, United States v. Bag-
ley, 140 defines evidence as being material, and thus triggering the Brady
disclosure obligation, "only if there is a reasonable probability that, had
the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different." The Court emphasized this standard's result
oriented focus by defining a "reasonable probability" as "a probability
sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome."'' 41 Materiality, then,
is keyed exclusively to effect on result. In short, the Brady rule is con-
139. See infra note 166.
140. 473 U.S. 667, 682 (1985).
141. Id. The Court's exclusive focus on result found in the definitions of materiality and
reasonable probability is echoed and reinforced throughout the rest of the Court's opinion.
The Court relied in part on precedent in the Bagley opinion, using both the language and the
results of earlier cases to justify the result oriented focus it adopted. The Court quoted lan-
guage from United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1976), which found concern with out-
come "implicit in the requirement of materiality." 473 U.S. at 674-75. From Giglio v. United
States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972), the Court quoted language indicating the insignificance of
disclosure of "evidence possibly useful to the defense but not likely to have changed the ver-
dict." 473 U.S. at 677. From Brady, the Court pointed out that the new trial ordered for the
defendant in that case was limited only to the issue of punishment since the evidence at issue
could only have affected the outcome on punishment and not on guilt. Id. at 675. As the use
of each of these cases makes clear, the Court's orientation is toward result.
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cerned only with a narrow range of evidence, disclosure of which has a
very strong and direct correlation with the "result of the proceeding."' 142
Disclosure of Brady material has an outcome determinative quality
in the guilty plea context, just as it does in the trial context. Since the
defendant's calculation of the likelihood of conviction at trial is a critical
element in the decision to plead, evidence that dramatically changes the
likelihood of conviction at trial should have an equally dramatic effect on
the defendant's willingness to plead.143 At trial the Brady material's ef-
fect is on the fact finder in resolving the question of the defendant's guilt.
In the guilty plea process, the Brady material's effect is on the defendant
and his lawyer in resolving the question of whether to plead or go to trial.
In both situations, Brady material has a strong and direct correlation to
result.
The verbal formulation of the Brady materiality rule, speaking as it
does of a change in the result of the "proceeding" rather than just trial,
seems to recognize that Brady material can have a result determining
effect outside of the trial context, as in a guilty plea proceeding. In a
recent case, the Supreme Court acknowledged that exculpatory evidence
can have just such an outcome determinative effect in a guilty plea pro-
ceeding. 144 Application of Brady to guilty pleas, then, meets the literal
requirement of the Brady rule that the evidence in question be outcome
determinative.
142. The only exception is in the area of perjury, treated infra notes 164-69 and accompa-
nying text.
143. For a highly risk averse defendant, the disclosure might not change the defendant's
mind about pleading guilty, but simply allow him to drive a better bargain. Here too, though,
the disclosure would change the outcome in terms of varying the terms of the plea bargain.
144. In Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985) (footnote omitted), the Supreme Court
articulated an outcome determinative test for assessing ineffective assistance of counsel claims
in the guilty plea context: "the defendant must show that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on
going to trial." Like the current materiality test under the Brady doctrine, this outcome deter-
minative test was drawn from Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). Hill, 474 U.S. at
57-59. One of the hypotheticals chosen by Justice Rehnquist for illustrating outcome determi-
native impact in a guilty plea situation was the failure of defense counsel to investigate or
discover potentially exculpatory evidence. Id. at 59. Justice Rehnquist pointed to the close tie
between exculpatory evidence's potential impact on the outcome of trial and its impact on the
defendant's decision to plead:
For example, where the alleged error of counsel is a failure to investigate or discover
potentially exculpatory evidence, the determination whether the error "prejudiced"
the defendant by causing him to plead guilty rather than go to trial will depend on
the likelihood that discovery of the evidence would have led counsel to change his
recommendation as to the plea. This assessment, in turn, will depend in large part on
a prediction whether the evidence likely would have changed the outcome of a trial.
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b. Factual Accuracy
The present Supreme Court's use of outcome determinative analysis,
as in the Brady materiality standard, generally correlates with the
Court's underlying concern with factual accuracy. The connection be-
comes clear when one takes a broader look at the Supreme Court's use of
outcome determinative standards and their derivation from harmless er-
ror doctrine. 45 This approach reflects the Court's view that "[tihe
harmless error doctrine recognizes the principle that the central purpose
of a criminal trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt
or innocence."'' 46 Indeed, this reasoning "lies at the very core of the
Court's harmless error jurisprudence."' 147 The fact that current Brady
doctrine incorporates a version of the harmless error test suggests that a
primary concern of the doctrine is with the factual question of the de-
fendant's guilt or innocence. 1 48 Indeed, the fact that the Bagley case uses
a version of the harmless error doctrine, not just as a remedial rule but to
define the very scope of the Brady right, suggests an even greater impor-
tance to the factual accuracy question in Brady doctrine.
Other features of the Bagley opinion reinforce this theme of concern
for accuracy of result. For instance, the Court uses "fair trial" language
to describe the scope of the disclosure duty: the prosecutor is required
"only to disclose evidence favorable to the accused that, if suppressed,
would deprive the defendant of a fair trial." 149 These passages initially
seem inconsistent with a focus on result because the idea of fairness is
commonly used to denote something other than accuracy of result. It
has often been used to convey the idea of conforming to established rules
145. Focus on result and the use of counter-factual inquiry to gauge the degree of impact
on outcome of a constitutional violation stems from Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18
(1967). Stacy & Dayton, supra note 138, at 82-83; Weisberg, Forward: Criminal Procedure
Doctrine: Some Versions of the Skeptical, 76 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 832, 846 (1985).
Chapman 's harmless error doctrine, however, has been transformed by the Supreme Court into
"[a] large category of supposedly disparate doctrines ... that may be very loosely placed under
the principle of 'harmless illegality.' " Weisberg, supra, at 846. In a detailed review of harm-
less error doctrine, Stacy and Dayton have charted the growing reliance of the Supreme Court
on the harmless error approach from Chapman to the Supreme Court's present position that
the harmless error approach "is presumptively appropriate for virtually every kind of constitu-
tional error." Stacy & Dayton, supra note 138, at 84.
146. Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S 673, 681 (1986) (citation omitted).
147. Stacy & Dayton, supra note 138, at 80.
148. Professor Weisberg describes the Bagley opinion's use of a result oriented standard to
define the Brady right as the principle of harmless illegality simply masquerading in another
guise. Weisberg, supra note 146, at 846 (footnote omitted). Stacy and Dayton also see the
Brady standard set forth in Bagley as simply a variant of the broader harmless error theme.
Stacy & Dayton, supra note 139, at 85.
149. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985).
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and procedures. 150 The apparent inconsistency in the Court's reliance on
fairness in Bagley evaporates, however, when one consults other recent
cases for the meaning the Court attaches to "fair trial" in its present
vernacular. In Strickland v. Washington, the case from which the pres-
ent Brady materiality standard was taken, the Court defined a "fair trial"
as one with a reliable result. 5 1 The emphasis on reliable result shows
that the Court's fair trial language is simply another way of expressing
the Court's concern with accuracy of result. 152
The dominant theme, then, of current Brady doctrine is a concern
with disclosure of evidence that is both outcome determinative and
closely tied to accuracy of guilt determination. The arguments in section
II advance this concern since they demonstrate that Brady disclosure in
the guilty plea process is both outcome determinative and closely tied to
the accuracy of a guilty plea.
c. Governmental Obligation
Another theme of present Brady doctrine, and one that runs back to
the original Brady opinion, is the special obligation of the prosecutor to
justice.' 53 The Bagley court noted that the Brady materiality standard is
more lenient to the defense than the standard for a new trial motion
based on newly discovered evidence not in the government's possession
150. "To say that a procedure is being fairly operated is to say that the formalities which
define the procedure have been correctly adhered to." B. BARRY, POLITICAL ARGUMENT 97
(1965). "When we speak of the term 'fair trial,' to be accurate we should mean a trial con-
ducted within the framework of procedural and substantive rules prescribed by law ......
McGregor v. Clawson, 506 S.W.2d 922, 929 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
151. "In giving meaning to [the right to counsel], we must take its purpose-to ensure a
fair trial-as the guide .... This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to
deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 686-87 (1984) (emphasis added).
152. "[T]he Court has expressed a reductionist notion of what a 'fair trial' means, defining
it merely as a trial designed to produce a reliable outcome." Stacy & Dayton, supra note 139,
at 86 (citing both Bagley and Strickland as illustrating this reductionist concept of fairness).
153. In the Brady opinion, Justice Douglas in explaining the principle underlying Brady
and its predecessor cases quoted Judge Simon Sobeloff:
The Solicitor General is not a neutral, he is an advocate; but an advocate for a
client whose business is not merely to prevail in the instant case. My client's chief
business is not to achieve victory but to establish justice. We are constantly re-
minded of the now classic words penned by one of my illustrious predecessors, Fred-
erick William Lehmann, that the Government wins its point when justice is done in
its courts.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 n.2 (1963). "[T]he [Brady] Court's language demonstrates
a concern with something more than the inaccuracy that could result when a defendant has no
knowledge of favorable material evidence; the prosecutor's role as causing the innaccuracy is
also important." Note, supra note 22, at 1005.
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because of the "prosecutor's obligation to serve the cause of justice."'' 54
The Court reasoned that if the standard applied to the motion for a new
trial was the same regardless of whether the exculpatory evidence was
found in a neutral source or in the government, there would be no special
significance to the prosecutor's obligation to serve the cause of justice. 55
A number of observations about this theme of governmental obliga-
tion are pertinent. First, even after the prosecutor's special obligation to
justice is factored in, the Brady materiality formula still limits disclosure
to evidence that would probably change the result. 156 Thus, the prosecu-
tor's justice obligation is only to avoid inaccurate results rather than to
treat defendants equally, a traditional view of justice. 157 In short, it
seems that the Supreme Court has a reductionist notion of justice similar
to the reductionist notion of fairness demonstrated in its view of what
constitutes a "fair trial." Justice and fairness have been reduced simply
to synonyms of concern for accuracy of result.
Second, actual comparison of the Brady standard with the standard
used in new trial motions based on newly discovered evidence reveals a
difference that seems little more than semantic. 158 The fact that the pros-
ecutor's special obligation only has the effect of moving the materiality
154. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 680 (1985) (quoting United States v. Agurs,
427 U.S. 97, 111-12 (1972)). In another part of the Bagley opinion, reconciling the Brady duty
with the requirements of the adversary system, the Court again emphasized the prosecutor's
special obligation, noting that:
[b]y requiring the prosecutor to assist the defense in making its case, the Brady rule
represents a limited departure from a pure adversary model. The Court has recog-
nized, however, that the prosecutor's role transcends that of an adversary: he "is the
representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a sovereignty...
whose interest ... in a criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done."
Id. at 675 n.6 (citation omitted).
155. Id. at 680 (citing Agurs, 427 U.S. at 111).
156. In the Court's view, the prosecutor apparently has a broader obligation to process as
opposed to result only in the area of use of perjury. See infra notes 164-69 and accompanying
text.
157. The Supreme Court's apparent definition of justice, though consonant with the
Court's central concern with accuracy of result, is at odds with traditional notions of justice.
"[T]he idea of justice is that individuals are entitled in respect of each other to a certain rela-
tive position of equality or inequality ... and its leading precept is often formulated as 'Treat
like cases alike.'" H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 155 (1961).
158. The standard generally applied to a motion for a new trial on the basis of newly
discovered evidence not in possession of the government is that the new evidence "probably
would have resulted in acquittal." Agurs, 427 U.S. at 111 (footnote omitted). When the gov-
ernment was in possession of the evidence and it qualifies as Brady material, the standard is
whether there is "a reasonable probability" that with disclosure of the evidence "the result of
the proceeding would have been different." Bagley, 473 U.S. at 682 (quoting Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984)).
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standard to at best a slightly more lenient position than the traditional
new trial standard suggests that the governmental obligation rationale
plays only a negligible role in current Brady doctrine. Such a conclusion,
however, understates the functional importance of the prosecutor's
involvement.
The remedy of a motion for new trial based on newly discovered
evidence is statutory and not of constitutional dimension. 159 In the fed-
eral system it is provided by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33.
Constitutional due process is implicated only when the government has
possession of the favorable evidence. In other words, even exculpatory
evidence showing gross inaccuracy does not give rise to a constitutional
remedy unless the government's obligation to disclose is involved. Thus,
the prosecutor's involvement, even though it has only a negligible impact
on the materiality standard, is a key ingredient in invoking the constitu-
tional protection of due process embodied in the Brady rule.
This theme in Brady doctrine of a special obligation of the prosecu-
tor to avoid an inaccurate result provides some guidance in determining
the proper use of Brady disclosure in the guilty plea context. There are
obvious differences between the prosecutor's role in the trial process and
her role in the guilty plea process. She takes a more obvious and open
role in shaping the result in a trial than she does in the guilty plea pro-
cess. At trial, the prosecutor selects and presents the evidence and ar-
gues based on that evidence for a finding of guilt. It is the engaging in
this activity, this active part in shaping the trial result, that seems to
trigger the constitutional Brady disclosure duty.
In the guilty plea process, the prosecutor's role in shaping the result
is less open and obvious. The traditional notion of a guilty plea as a
unilateral gesture of contrition, confession, and acceptance of guilt160 in-
sulates the prosecutor from responsibility for the result. But the more
modern conception of the guilty plea as a negotiated resolution to a crim-
inal dispute casts the prosecutor in a role in which her actions as negotia-
tor shape the guilty plea proceeding and its result as much as her actions
159. See P. JOHNSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 627-28 (1988). "It is important to distin-
guish the constitutional issue (knowing use of perjured testimony or suppression of exculpatory
evidence) from the non-constitutional question of when a defendant can obtain a new trial on
the basis of newly discovered evidence." Id. at 627.
160. See, e.g., United States ex rel Starnes v. Russell, 378 F.2d 808, 811 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 889 (1967):
[There is much to be said for the Commonwealth's position that on a plea of guilty
the defendant has already entered on the rehabilitative process, that he is purging
himself thereby of his wrongdoing, and it must be conceded that a sense of contrition
therefore must have motivated his conduct.
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as litigator shape the trial and its result. In both a trial and a negotiated
guilty plea, she is the "architect of a proceeding" that bears heavily on a
defendant. 16 1 Rather than calling witnesses, introducing evidence, and
arguing the factual inferences to be drawn from the evidence, the prose-
cutor as negotiator shapes the conditions and inducements for the plea.
Consider, for example, a hypothetical in which the prosecutor did not
divulge totally exculpatory information and the defendant pleaded guilty
in response to the offer of a large sentencing differential to avoid a very
high sentencing exposure after trial. In this situation the prosecutor, by
offering a sentencing differential, failing to disclose exculpatory informa-
tion, and accepting the plea, is the "architect" of an inaccurate convic-
tion as much as the prosecutor who fails to disclose such information at a
trial of the same defendant.
If the prosecutor as negotiator actively and powerfully shapes the
result of the guilty plea proceeding, the governmental obligation theme in
the Brady doctrine supports imposition of a disclosure duty in the guilty
plea process as well as at trial. The Brady doctrine clearly calls for a
special responsibility on the part of the prosecutor for the accuracy of the
result in a criminal case. The Supreme Court has told us that the negoti-
ated guilty plea is to be accepted and utilized as an "essential" and
"highly desirable" component of our criminal justice system. 162 Current
statistics reveal that it is the criminal justice system's primary means for
resolving essential questions of guilt and innocence. 63 If the prosecu-
tor's primary role is to be that of negotiator, and if she is to be permitted
to offer the powerful inducements to plead guilty that current Supreme
Court doctrine allows, then recognition of that special responsibility is at
least as important in the negotiation context as in the trial context.
d. Perjury
In one area only, current Brady doctrine does not apply a result
oriented standard. In the area of knowing use of perjury by the prosecu-
tion, the standard is more demanding of the prosecutor and requires
broader disclosure. If the prosecutor has used perjury knowingly, or has
failed to disclose that perjured testimony was used to convict the defend-
ant, then "the fact that the testimony is perjured is considered material
unless failure to disclose it would be considered harmless beyond a rea-
161. Withholding exculpatory evidence at trial "casts the prosecutor in the role of an ar-
chitect of a proceeding that does not comport with standards of justice." Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. at 88.
162. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1979).
163. See supra note 3.
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sonable doubt."' The reason given for the broader disclosure duty is
that such use of perjured testimony "involves prosecutorial misconduct
and, more importantly, involves 'a corruption of the truth-seeking func-
tion of the trial process.' "165
Perhaps the special concern with perjury stems from the fact that it
is a crime. Perhaps it stems from the fact that perjury seems more of an
affront to the court than plain nondisclosure. The special concern with
perjury, though, may have more to do with the history of the Brady rule
than logic.1 66 Regardless of the reason, the important point for our pur-
pose is that present Brady doctrine singles out the avoidance of perjury
as a particular concern.
The Brady rule's concern with preventing perjury in the trial setting
also is implicated in the guilty plea context. Judicial inquiry into the
factual basis for a plea is a routine feature of the guilty plea process. 167
Although the prosecution may fulfill the factual basis requirement, 68
normally it takes the form of inquiry of the defendant. The judge, or
sometimes the prosecutor, asks questions, and the defendant in response
admits the facts necessary to fulfill the essential elements of the crime.
This procedure is the only attempt made during the guilty plea process to
satisfy the court of the defendant's factual guilt.
If an innocent defendant pleads guilty, then he normally must not
only formally withdraw his plea of not guilty and substitute a plea of
guilty, he must also make false statements in which he admits the facts
constituting the essential elements of the crime, sometimes under oath. 169
Thus, the pressure exerted in Brady cases on an innocent defendant to
164. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 680 (1985).
165. Id. (quoting United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 104 (1972)).
166. In the original Brady opinion, Justice Douglas stamped the Brady doctrine as the
offspring of a line of cases dealing with perjury on the part of a prosecution witness in criminal
trials. 373 U.S. at 86. This series of cases had first established that a prosecutor's intentional
use of perjury violated due process. See Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942); Mooney v.
Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 112 (1935). Later cases established that the prosecutor's failure to
correct perjury violated due process. See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269 (1959). Suppres-
sion of exculpatory information was implicit in each of these cases, since knowing use or fail-
ure to correct perjury inevitably entails failure to disclose the information by which the
prosecutor knows that the testimony is perjured. In Brady, the link between perjury and sup-
pression was severed and for the first time suppression outside of the perjury context stood on
its own as a due process violation rather than as a subordinate and necessarily incidental facet
of perjury.
167. Although it has not been recognized explicitly as a constitutional requirement for a
plea, it is required by rule in both federal court and many state courts. See, e.g., FED. R.
CRIM. P. 11(f).
168. See, e.g., North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 28 & n.10 (1970).
169. See supra note 45.
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plead guilty, illustrated in section II(B), often includes pressure to com-
mit perjury. Even if the oath is not administered to the defendant, a
guilty plea by an innocent defendant entails false statements to a court
closely akin to perjury. In either case, as with perjury at trial, there is
deliberate deception of the court.
If applying the Brady rule to guilty pleas will have the effect of re-
ducing pressure on innocent defendants to plead guilty, then it will have
a concomitant and incidental effect of reducing the pressure to commit
perjury or make other false statements as a means of obtaining the guilty
plea's benefits. Thus, the Brady rule's concern for protecting the crimi-
nal process from perjury will be served by applying the Brady rule in the
guilty plea context.
The suggestion that perjury by a government witness against a de-
fendant at trial and perjury by a defendant used to gain the advantage of
a plea bargain should be given equal weight under Brady doctrine may
appear too facile. After all, the defendant in the trial scenario is the vic-
tim of that crime, but the defendant in the guilty plea scenario is the
perpetrator. Perhaps we should not be as concerned about protecting the
defendant from his own perjury as we are about protecting him from the
perjury of government witnesses. Or perhaps the defendant's unclean
hands as a perjurer should keep him from claiming the remedial benefits
of the rule.
Without question, the types of perjury engendered by failure to dis-
close Brady material in the trial and plea contexts are quite different. But
the argument dismissing perjury in the guilty plea context as a concern
should be treated as unavailing for several reasons. First, perjury impli-
cates larger institutional concerns with the accuracy of criminal proceed-
ings beyond the defendant's protection. These concerns may well be
more important in the guilty plea context than at trial since the defend-
ant's confession is the sole basis for conviction in a guilty plea, while
perjury at trial may form only a part of the basis for conviction and its
effect may be diluted by other evidence. Moreover, the moral culpability
of the innocent defendant who commits perjury to avoid the risk of trial
is dissipated by the degree of coercion inherent in confronting the defend-
ant with the sort of sentencing differential pressure Brady cases tend to
generate. In fact, the government created that coercion by simultane-
ously offering a powerful inducement to plead guilty and failing to dis-
close Brady material. Although probably not sufficient to establish a
defense to a perjury charge, such factors make a criminal defendant par-
ticularly susceptible to perjury. Accordingly, the existence of these pres-
sures increases the need to take steps to avoid such perjury and mitigates
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the criminal defendant's moral blame if he does engage in it. Perhaps
more to the point, nowhere does the Brady doctrine suggest that one of
its purposes is to function as a litmus test of the defendant's moral culpa-
bility. The concern with perjury, though not pivotal in deciding Brady's
applicability to guilty pleas, certainly weighs in favor of its application.
(2) The Guilty Plea Cases
The second area of constitutional doctrine that is relevant in explor-
ing extension of the Brady rule is the Supreme Court's line of guilty plea
cases. The Supreme Court's guilty plea cases in this area reflect a
number of major themes relevant to our inquiry.
First, the Court is clearly committed to the negotiated guilty plea as
a necessary and desirable'component of the criminal justice system.170
Recognition of Brady as a due process right of defendants who plead
guilty does not challenge this commitment. The acceptance of Brady
does not amount to a broad based challenge to the validity or accuracy of
guilty pleas in general. Rather, it is simply a means for making a portion
of those pleas more reliable. In fact, application of the Brady rule to
guilty pleas should encourage defendants to plead guilty. If the Brady
right were openly recognized as not applying in guilty plea cases, how-
ever, defendants would be given an increased incentive to go to trial on
the chance that Brady material might be forthcoming.
A second major theme in the Supreme Court's guilty plea cases is
the repeated assertion that guilty pleas are factually accurate. 171 The
170. See, e.g., Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 361-64 (1978); Blackledge v. Allison,
431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977) ("[The guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bargain are impor-
tant components of this country's criminal justice system. Properly administered, they can
benefit all concerned."); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971) (Plea bargaining
"is an essential component of the administration of justice. Properly administered, it is to be
encouraged.... Disposition of charges after plea discussions is not only an essential part of the
process, but a highly desirable part for many reasons.").
171. See, e.g., Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 363 ("defendants advised by competent counsel
and protected by other procedural safeguards are ... unlikely to be driven to false self-con-
demnation"); Menna v. New York, 423 U.S. 61, 62 n.2"(1975) (per curiam) ("a counseled plea
of guilty is an admission of factual guilt so reliable that, where voluntary and intelligent, it
quite validly removes the issue of factual guilt from the case"). The premise of this article is
that factual accuracy is important in guilty pleas. As noted previously, this premise is not
uncontroversial. It is based on a paradigm of the guilty plea as an adjudication of critical
factual issues rather than a compromise of them. See supra note 38. The Supreme Court has
given mixed signals as to which paradigm of the guilty plea it adheres to. Its repeated empha-
sis on accuracy and its importance in guilty pleas reflects adoption of the adjudication para-
digm. The Court, however, has found constitutional a guilty plea by a defendant who
maintains his innocence. Alford, 400 U.S. at 25. It also permits conviction of a criminal de-
fendant with no inquiry into guilt based on a plea of nolo contendere. Hudson v. United States,
272 U.S. 451, 457 (1926). The acceptance by the court of such Alford and nolo pleas reflects
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Court frequently has appeared unwilling to examine the assumptions
that underlie this assertion, that the defendant always knows the facts
determining guilt and is sincere if he confesses them in a guilty plea. 17 2
For example, the Court has given no sign of willingness to consider the
impact of the magnitude of sentencing differentials on the defendant's
sincerity in confessing guilt. A refusal to entertain any challenge or qual-
ification to the assumptions underlying its assertion of the guilty plea's
accuracy would lead the Court to dismiss the accuracy implications of
Brady disclosure as either unnecessary or redundant.
Another theme found in the guilty plea cases, however, provides
hope that the Court may be open to the need for Brady disclosure in the
guilty plea process. A frequently expressed corollary to the Supreme
Court's accuracy assertion is the need for procedural safeguards to assure
accuracy. The Court has stressed that the guilty plea as a "mode of con-
viction is no more foolproof than full trials to the court or to the jury"
and that, consequently, "great precautions against unsound results"
should be taken.1 73 "This phase of the process of criminal justice, and
the adjudicative element inherent in accepting a plea of guilty, must be
attended by safeguards to ensure the defendant what is reasonably due in
the circumstances."' 174 This stress in the Supreme Court's language on
the procedural protections necessary to assure the guilty plea's accuracy
provides an analytic niche in present doctrine which would allow recog-
nition that the Brady rule is a safeguard that is due defendants who plead
guilty.
Another theme reflected in the Supreme Court's guilty plea cases
that is relevant and potentially troublesome for application of the Brady
disclosure rule to guilty pleas is that of loss of constitutional rights by
guilty plea, the idea that a defendant who pleads guilty waives or forfeits
certain constitutional rights, such as the right to jury trial. 175 An argu-
ment for waiver of Brady might highlight the court's characterization of
adherence to a paradigm of compomise of factual issues. The Court's ambivalence about both
adjudication and accuracy are aptly exemplified by the fact that the Court has not given consti-
tutional status to the only direct guarantee of accuracy in a normal guilty plea the factual basis
inquiry. See A. GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY 39-47 (1981).
172. See Seidman supra note 138 at 470-83. "The guilty plea cases . . .make the point
[that w]hile consistently ignoring the truth-distorting effect of plea bargaining, the Court has
been scrupulous in enforcing the procedural niceties concerning the method by which the plea
is taken." Id. at 481.
173. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 758 (1970).
174. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).
175. This line of cases is most often identified as originating with the "Brady trilogy":
Parker v. North Carolina, 397 U.S. 790 (1970); McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970);
Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
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the Brady rule as grounded in the constitutional right to a fair trial. 176 If
Brady is seen as a trial right, the conclusion might well follow that one
who pleads guilty forgoes the Brady right just as he does other trial
rights, such as the rights to confront witnesses and to have a jury deter-
mine the facts.
A counter argument could be based on the passages in which the
Supreme Court emphasizes a broader, more generalized due process
grounding of the rule. 177 Since due process transcends trial and applies
in many contexts of the criminal justice system other than trial, including
the procedure for taking a guilty plea, this broader due process ground-
ing for the Brady rule weighs in favor of a broader application of the
rule. 178 Support for this broader due process view of the rule is found in
the explicit incorporation into the original Brady rule formulation of the
requirement for the prosecution to turn over favorable evidence that is
"material ... to punishment" as well as that which relates to guilt. 179
This mitigation facet of the rule clearly seems to acknowledge that Brady
has a role to play at sentencing as well as in the guilt determination phase
normally associated with trial. Thus, it would seem that the Brady rule
transcends the trial context. 180 Recognizing that Brady is more properly
characterized as a due process rather than simply a trial right, though,
does not answer the question of whether due process requires application
176. The opinion in Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), treated its holding as simply
an extension of precedent and described the principle drawn from those precedents as "not
punishment of society for misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the
accused." Id. at 87 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court continues to use the notion of a fair
trial in expressing the grounding of the Brady right. See supra notes 150-51 and accompanying
text.
177. See, e.g., United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 675 (1985). ("The Brady rule is based
on the requirement of due process.").
178. Due process applies at many stages of a criminal proceeding. For example, there are
due process requirements for the initial charging decision, Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21,
27-29 (1974); pretrial detention, United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 751-52 (1987); sen-
tencing, Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 358 (1977) (plurality opinion per Stevens, J.); and
probation revocation, Douglas v. Buder, 412 U.S. 430, 432 (1973). Guilty plea procedures also
have been held to due process standards. See Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637, 647 (1976).
179. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. at 87.
180. The original Brady case was a sentencing case dealing with mitigating rather than
exculpatory information. The sentencing in Brady, a capital case, was by jury trial, as is not
uncommon in capital cases. The "mitigation" facet of the rule, although repeated in all
Supreme Court Brady cases, remains largely unexplored and unutilized. But see Caron, The
Capital Defendant's Right to Obtain Exculpatory Evidence from the Prosecution to Present in
Mitigation Before Sentencing, 23 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 207 (1985) (examining the capital de-
fendant's right to present mitigating evidence before sentencing). Justice Marshall, in a dissent
from denial of certiorari, has recently urged the Court to deal with the issue of the Brady rule's
application in the sentencing phase of a capital trial. Neelby v. Alabama, 109 S. Ct. 821, 822
(1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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of Brady to guilty pleas. It simply helps to defuse the waiver argument
based on characterization of the rule as a trial right reviewed above.
Looking beyond the text of the Brady rule and the Brady v. Mary-
land line of cases, what guidance do the Supreme Court guilty plea cases
provide in determining whether the Brady right is lost in pleading guilty?
The Brady right is not normally included in the litany of rights read to
the defendant during the plea process. Therefore, it is not waived explic-
itly. A defendant pleading guilty might cure any ambiguity about waiver
by asking the prosecution to incorporate a specific representation that all
Brady material had been disclosed as a term of the plea bargain put on
the record at the time of entry of the plea. The defendant would then be
entitled to rescind the plea if the representation was false.'81 But in the
entry of most guilty pleas, no mention is made of the Brady right.
The Supreme Court's guilty plea cases t82 have established the idea
that a guilty plea acts as an implicit waiver or forfeiture of certain consti-
tutional rights beyond those explicitly waived during the guilty plea pro-
cedure. This implicit waiver or forfeiture, though, does not extend to all
constitutional rights. 183 In which category does the Brady disclosure
right belong? Is it one of the constitutional rights waived or forfeited, or
should it be counted among the constitutional rights retained?
Existing Supreme Court precedent on the issue of loss of constitu-
tional rights inherent in the guilty plea does not yield an answer readily.
These cases have drawn considerable critical scholarly attention because
they are both significant and controversial. 84 One of their most conspic-
uous features, however, is confusion regarding the principle upon which
they are based. In Menna v. New York, the Supreme Court offered the
following interpretation of this line of cases: "A guilty plea ... simply
181. See Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262 (1971).
182. See supra note 175.
183. One who pleads guilty loses the right to challenge constitutionally the voluntariness
of a confession, McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 766-68 (1970), or the racial composi-
tion of the indicting grand jury. Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 266 (1973). A defendant
who pleads guilty, though, does not lose the right to raise a constitutional challenge based on
vindictive prosecution. Blackledge v.Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 29-31 (1974). He also retains the
right to raise certain constitutional claims based on double jeopardy. Menna v. New York, 423
U.S. 61, 62 (1975) (per curiam). The most recent Supreme Court case in this area holds that
even some double jeopardy claims may not be raised following a plea bargain. United States v.
Bruce, 109 S. Ct. 957 (1989).
184. See, e.g., Alschuler, The Supreme Court, the Defense Attorney, and the Guilty Plea, 47
U. COLO. L. REV. 1 (1975); Dix, Waiver in Criminal Procedure: A Brief for More Careful
Analysis, 55 TEx. L. REV. 193 (1977); Tigar, Foreword: Waiver of Constitutional Rights: Dis-
quiet in the Citadel, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1970); Note, The Guilty Plea as a Waiver of "Present
but Unknowable" Constitutional Rights: The Aftermath of the Brady Trilogy, 74 COLUM. L.
REV. 1435 (1974) (authored by Robert N. Schwartz).
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renders irrelevant those constitutional violations not logically inconsis-
tent with the valid establishment of factual guilt. s18 5 The Court's use of
a triple negative clouds the meaning of this sentence, typifying the mud-
dled state of the law in this area.1 86 As Professor Saltzburg has noted,
"The state of the law respecting the rights foregone after pleading guilty
is obviously unsatisfactory. Nothing in the language of any of the
Supreme Court's cases articulates a rule that helps even slightly in ad-
dressing new cases or evaluating the merits of those already decided."18 7
The task of identifying the principle that explains these cases has
absorbed the efforts of a number of commentators.18 8 Resolution of this
issue is well beyond the scope of this Article. Rather, it ventures only so
far as to examine a number of theories that have been offered to explain
these cases and assess the result for the Brady disclosure right under
those theories. Finally, the Article suggests that the proper way to ana-
lyze application of the Brady disclosure right in the guilty plea context is
to rely on none of these theories, but rather on analogy to the right to
effective assistance of counsel, which all agree is a constitutional right
that is neither waived nor forfeited by guilty plea.
If the Menna theory suggested by the passage quoted above means
that only constitutional claims unrelated to factual guilt survive, then the
Brady disclosure right, if grounded in concern for accuracy of the deter-
mination of factual guilt, would seem to be lost. Under Professor
Saltzburg's theory of these cases, a defendant who pleads guilty loses all
constitutional rights except those "premised on notions of litigation
avoidance."'' 8 9 Unlike such "litigation avoidance" rights as double jeop-
ardy or vindictive prosecution, the Brady disclosure right is not premised
on litigation avoidance. Rather, it assumes that a trial will take place
and that disclosure is necessary at such a trial. Thus, Professor
Saltzburg's theory seems to require the conclusion that the Brady right is
185. 423 U.S. at 62 n.2.
186. B. GARNER, A DICTIONARY OF MODERN LEGAL USAGE 372-73 (1987) ("Lawyers
have become notorious for their proclivity to pile negative upon negative. The result is
sentences that most fellow lawyers have a hard time decoding."). Professor Saltzburg finds it
necessary to correct the Court's language in the Menna footnote in order to make sense of the
passage. See Saltzburg, Pleas of Guilty and the Loss of Constitutional Rights: The Current
Price of Pleading Guilty, 76 MICH. L. REV. 1265, 1278 n.69 (1978) ("I assume that the Court
erred in its choice of words. Obviously, it should have said 'consistent' not 'inconsistent.' ").
187. Saltzburg, supra note 186, at 1280.
188. See, e.g., Saltzburg, supra note 186; Westen, Forfeiture by Guilty Plea-A Reply, 76
MICH. L. REv. 1308 (1978); Westen, Away from Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture of
Constitutional Rights in Criminal Procedure, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1214 (1977) [hereinafter Wes-
ten, Away from Waiver].
189. Saltzburg, supra note 186, at 1267.
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lost with the guilty plea. Professor Westen's forfeiture theory claims that
only those constitutional claims survive that "if asserted before trial,
would forever preclude the state from obtaining a valid conviction
against" the defendant. 190 If by preclusion Professor Westen means legal
preemption of the prosecution's right to bring the defendant to trial, the
Brady disclosure right would not qualify for the same reason it fails to
meet Professor Saltzburg's theory: it does not legally preempt trial of the
defendant. 191
The weakness of the theories advanced above is demonstrated by
using them to evaluate the right to effective assistance of counsel. The
cases and commentators agree that the right to effective assistance of
counsel survives a guilty plea. 192 Under the Menna footnote theory, it is
certainly possible that factual guilt could be established without the rep-
resentation of counsel. The right to effective assistance of counsel is not a
"litigation avoidance" right as required by Professor Saltzburg's theory
to survive the guilty plea. Nor does the right to counsel operate as the
kind of preclusive bar that Professor Westen would require. How then is
it that the right to effective assistance of counsel survives a guilty plea?
The survival of this right indicates that there is an implied exception to
the waiver or forfeiture of rights in addition to those described by the
theories set forth above: those constitutional rights that assure the integ-
rity of the guilty plea process itself. The right to counsel is such a right.
And based on the arguments advanced in section II of this Article, Brady
disclosure is such a right.
Exemption from waiver or forfeiture of rights that determine the
integrity of the guilty plea process is consistent with the major themes of
the Supreme Court's guilty plea cases. If the criminal justice system is to
accept and rely on the guilty plea as an "essential" and "highly desira-
ble" procedural vehicle for resolving questions of guilt, as the Supreme
Court stated in Santobello, 193 then the systemic importance of the integ-
rity of the guilty plea process and those rights that assure its integrity
seem vital. If Supreme Court doctrine is going to rely, as in Menna, on
190. Westen, Away from Waiver, supra note 188, at 1226.
191. Brady disclosure may, of course, have the practical effect of preempting trial. For
example, disclosure of completely exculpatory information will almost always result in dismis-
sal. Comment, supra note 22, at 191 ("if Westen's model is applied to Brady v. Maryland, the
defendant's right to prosecutorial disclosure of material and favorable evidence is forfeited by a
guilty plea because a claim based on this right does not forever preclude the state from ob-
taining a valid conviction." Id.).
192. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985): Saltzburg, supra note 186, at 1274 n.53
("Plainly the competence of counsel could be challenged under the decisions.").
193. Santobello v. New york, 404 U.S. 257, 260-61 (1971).
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assertions that an accurate guilty plea satisfies fundamental concerns
with guilt and innocence, then it would be anomalous to find rights that
help guarantee the validity of the assertion of accuracy to be waived or
forfeited. Indeed, the Supreme Court has expressed this very idea in its
corollary to its assertion of accuracy, that procedural safeguards are nec-
essary in order to insure the accuracy of guilty pleas.
B. Brady Disclosure as an Ethical and Statutory Requirement
The ethics of negotiation, and in particular the ethical problems of
truthfulness and disclosure in negotiation, recently have attracted consid-
erable interest.194 In part this appears due to a realization that negotiat-
ing in various forms occupies a significant portion of almost every
lawyer's time. For trial lawyers in particular, the prevalence of negoti-
ated resolutions in both civil and criminal litigation means that litigators
in fact are involved much more often in settling cases than in trying
them. Recent statistics on the prevalence of guilty pleas, for example,
suggest that for every case tried by prosecutors and defense counsel,
eleven cases are resolved by guilty pleas. 195 The interest in negotiation
ethics may also be a function of the seeming intractability of the issues
the subject presents.196
Disclosure is a central issue in negotiation ethics. Although com-
mentators have argued for a duty of disclosure, 197 present negotiation
practice countenances nondisclosure. Certain affirmative misrepresenta-
tions are seen as unethical, but nondisclosure appears to be an accepted
convention for negotiators.198 In the words of two well-known authors in
the area of negotiation strategy, although lying is disapproved, "good
faith negotiation does not require total disclosure."' 199
194. See, ag., Guernsey, Truthfulness in Negotiation, 17 U. RICH. L. REV. 99 (1982); Haz-
ard, supra note 25; Lowenthal, The Bar's Failure to Require Truthful Bargaining by Lawyers, 2
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 411 (1988); Peters, The Use of Lies in Negotiation, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 1
(1987); Rubin, supra note 27; White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in
Negotiation, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 926 (1980).
195. See JUSTICE DEP'T STATISTICS, supra note 3, at 2.
196. Professor White explains the difficulty in drafting ethical norms for negotiation as
deriving in part from "the almost galactic scope of disputes that are subject to resolution by
negotiation" and the fact that misleading one's opponent is inherent in the negotiator's role.
White, supra note 194, at 927.
197. See Rubin, supra note 27, at 591.
198. See Peters, supra note 194, at 13; Rubin, supra note 27, at 584 ("The professional
literature contains many instances indicating that, in the general opinion of the bar, there is no
requirement that the lawyer disclose unfavorable evidence in the usual litigious situation.").
199. R. FISHER & W. URY, GETTING TO YES, NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT WITHOUT
GIVING IN 140 (1981).
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The present state of the ethical requirements for disclosure in nego-
tiation is epitomized in the fate of a negotiation disclosure rule proposed
for inclusion in the most recent comprehensive revision of the ethical
norms for American lawyers, the American Bar Association's Model
Rules of Professional Conduct, currently in force in a majority of juris-
dictions. The proposed rule required only limited disclosure by a lawyer
in negotiations-when required by law, by ethics rules, or to correct a
misapprehension of fact or law resulting from a previous representation
by the lawyer or the lawyer's client. 2°° Even this limited rule of disclo-
sure, however, was vehemently opposed and ultimately rejected. 20 1 Pro-
fessor Hazard explains the rejection as follows:
The fundamental difficulty appears to stem from the lack of a firm
professional consensus regarding the standard of openness that should
govern lawyers' dealings with others and the lack of settled and homo-
geneous standards of technique in the practice of law. This lack of
consensus indicates that lawyers, at least nationally, do not share a
common conception of fairness in the process of negotiation. The lack
of this consensus means that lawyers lack the language to express
norms of fairness in negotiation and the institutional means to give
effect to these norms.202
It is against this backdrop that the ethical disclosure obligations of
the prosecutor in negotiations must be viewed. One might think that the
formulation of ethical disclosure standards for a prosecutor negotiating
with counsel for a private citizen in a criminal matter would not have
been impeded by the same sort of uncertainty as that found in the civil
context. The idea that the prosecutor has a special obligation to justice
and accordingly is held to a higher standard than other lawyers is ex-
pressed in the Brady doctrine. 20 3 This notion of special obligation is
echoed in the ethical standards for prosecutors. 20 4 But examination of
200. The proposed rule provided:
4.2 Fairness to Other Participants
(a) In conducting negotiations a lawyer shall be fair in dealing with other par-
ticipants.
(b) A lawyer shall not make a knowing misrepresentation of fact or law, or fail
to disclose a material fact known to the lawyer, even if adverse, when disclosure is:
(1) Required by law or the Rules of Professional Conduct; or
(2) Necessary to correct a manifest misapprehension of fact or law result-
ing from a previous representation made by the lawyer or known by the lawyer
to have been made by the client.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.2 (Discussion Draft 1980).
201. Hazard, supra note 25, at 191-92.
202. Id. at 193 (footnote omitted).
203. See supra notes 124-34 and accompanying text.
204. See, e.g., Comment [1], Rule 3.8, MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
3.8 comment (1983) ("A prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not
simply that of an advocate.").
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the ethics rules regarding prosecutorial disclosure shows that rather than
explicitly expressing such a higher standard in the negotiation area,. they
seem to mirror the same ambiguity about plea bargaining reflected in the
constitutional rule of disclosure.
The Supreme Court has emphasized the importance of the ethical
rules governing prosecutors at trial:
In many ways the prosecutor, by accident or by design, may improp-
erly subvert the trial. The primary safeguard against abuses of this
kind is the ethical responsibility of the prosecutor who... may 'strike
hard blows' but not 'foul ones.' If that safeguard fails, review remains
available under due process standards .... 205
The prosecutor's duty under professional ethics codes to disclose
favorable evidence to a criminal defendant is explicit. 20 6 However, these
ethical rules dealing with the prosecutorial duty make no mention of plea
negotiations or guilty pleas. Rather, they reflect the same ambiguity
about disclosure in the guilty plea context as the constitutional Brady
rule does.207
This uncertainty leaves open the danger that the line between ethi-
cally appropriate and inappropriate behavior will be drawn by reference
to prevailing civil negotiation standards, which do not generally require
disclosure of evidence favorable to one's adversary.
The precise contours of the ethical norms for prosecutors in plea
bargaining, and in particular the norms for disclosure, are yet to be
205. United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 320 (1973) (citing Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87-88 (1963); Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)). Ash specifically mentioned
the withholding of evidence favorable to an accused as such an abuse. Id.
206. Disciplinary Rule 7-103(B) of the MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
provides:
A public prosecutor or other government lawyer in criminal litigation shall make
timely disclosure to counsel for the defendant, or to the defendant if he has no coun-
sel, of the existence of evidence, known to the prosecutor or other government law-
yer, that tends to negate the guilt of the accused, mitigate the degree of the offense, or
reduce the punishment.
Rule 3.8(d) of the MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT provides that the prosecutor
in a criminal case shall
make timely disclosure to the defense of all evidence or information known to the
prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the accused or mitigates the offense, and,
in connection with sentencing, disclose to the defense and to the tribunal all un-
privileged information known to the prosecutor, except when the prosecutor is re-
lieved of this responsibility by a protective order of the tribunal.
The formulation of each of these rules is more expansive than the original formulation of the
Brady rule, since neither contains a "materiality" limitation or a requirement that the material
be requested by the defense.
207. Although some treatise writers claim that MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
SIBILITY DR 7-103(B) (1981) requires disclosure in the plea bargaining context, no authority
for this proposition is provided. See J. LAWLESS, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT 318 (1985).
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shaped. For a number of reasons, the accuracy arguments in section II
could and should play an important role in assuring that disclosure of
Brady material in the guilty plea context is included in the prosecutor's
ethical mandate. First, the ethical norms for the prosecutor express
many of the same concerns underlying the constitutional Brady rule. For
example, the notion of the prosecutor's special obligation to justice finds
expression in constitutional Brady doctrine and in the ethical rules for
prosecutors. Thus, much of the argument set forth above for recognition
of Brady as a constitutional rule applies with equal force to the question
of incorporating a duty of Brady disclosure within the prosecutor's nego-
tiation ethics. But more practically, recognition that disclosure has accu-
racy implications in the guilty plea context should serve to distinguish
guilty plea negotiations from other negotiations, and consequently, the
ethics of guilty plea negotiations from general negotiation ethics. Unlike
other negotiations, the guilty plea has an adjudicative element-it estab-
lishes the factual basis for a conviction which will both stigmatize a crim-
inal defendant and expose him to the risk of loss of liberty and possibly
life. Thus, it deserves a different standard than that applied to other
negotiations.
Another means for achieving disclosure of Brady material in the
guilty plea process would be through a statute mandating disclosure.20 8
Such a statute could supplement a constitutional rule or serve as a substi-
tute if the Supreme Court finds the case for applying the constitutional
Brady rule to guilty pleas unpersuasive. In the related area of criminal
discovery, although arguments for recognition of a constitutional right to
discovery have been largely unavailing before the Supreme Court, argu-
ments in favor of broader discovery have been well received by many
legislatures and have resulted in the statutory enactment of broad discov-
ery rights for criminal defendants. 20 9 Similarly, legislatures could ad-
dress the problem of Brady disclosure in the guilty plea process.
The negotiated guilty plea in fact has drawn considerable attention
from both legislators and the drafters of model codes of criminal proce-
dure. Probably the most widely known statutory treatment of guilty plea
procedures is Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. Rule 11 simply
ignores the issue of the prosecution's disclosing evidence prior to entry of
a guilty plea, much less specifically addressing Brady material. Although
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16, the primary vehicle for criminal
208. State statutes may expand the number of constitutional rights that survive a guilty
plea in state court, and a defendant is not precluded from raising those additional rights in a
federal habeas corpus proceeding. Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283, 291-93 (1975).
209. Y. KAMISAR, W. LAFAVE & J. ISRAEL, supra note 4, at 1108.
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discovery in the federal system, does not explicitly use the terms
"favorable" or "exculpatory" evidence, it does contain provisions that
cover some Brady material.2 10 The notes to Rule 16 indicate that discov-
ery is intended to contribute "to the fair and efficient administration of
criminal justice by providing the defendant with enough information to
make an informed decision as to plea. '211 The text of Rule 16, however,
gives no indication that its provisions require preplea disclosure. Rule 16
is thus deficient in scope to assure complete Brady disclosure and also is
unclear about requiring disclosure prior to a guilty plea.
The Jenck's Act, another federal disclosure device, gives the defend-
ant a statutory right to prior written or recorded statements of a witness
that might net some Brady impeachment material. 212 Jenck's Act disclo-
sure, however, is not triggered unless and until the witness testifies at
trial.213 Thus, Jenck's Act disclosure is not required prior to a guilty
plea. In sum, existing federal rules and statutes are clearly inadequate to
ensure a guilty pleading defendant the right to disclosure of Brady
material.
Some model criminal procedure codes deal more effectively with the
issue. The National Advisory Commission's (NAC) rule is the clear-
est. 214 Standard 3.6 provides: - "No prosecutor should, in connection
with plea negotiations, engage in, perform, or condone any of the follow-
ing: ... Failing to grant full disclosure before the disposition negotiations
of all exculpatory evidence material to guilt or punishment. ' 21 5 The
commentary to this standard indicates that it requires pre-plea disclosure
"to the extent required by Brady v. Maryland.'' 21 6 No particular ration-
ale is provided other than a general reference to disclosure helping obtain
"the best possible compromise disposition. '217 The justifications offered
in the commentary for the general prohibition of improper inducements
to entering a guilty plea are promotion of "greater fairness in the negotia-
210. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(a)(1)(c) requires disclosure to the defendant upon request of
"books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects... which are material to the prepa-
ration of the defendant's defense." Rule 16(a)(1)(D) similarly requires disclosure of reports of
examinations and tests "which are material to the preparation of the defense."
211. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16 advisory committee's notes to 1974 amendment. The notes refer
to the ABA Standards dealt with infra notes 219-21 and accompanying text.
212. 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1985). The Jenck's Act's provisions are repeated and made recip-
rocal by FED. R. CRIM. P. 26.2.
213. 18 U.S.C. § 3500(a) (1985). Rule 26.2(a) imposes a similar limitation.
214. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM. CRIM. JUST. STANDARDS AND GOALS, REPORT ON
COURT (1973).
215. Id. at 57.
216. Id. at 58.
217. Id.
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tion process" and reducing post-conviction litigation.218 Accuracy of the
plea is not used as a justification for either the disclosure requirement or
the more general prohibition against improper inducements.
The American Bar Association model is less clear about requiring
pre-plea disclosure, but more generous than the NAC standard.2 1 9 Sec-
tion 2.1(c) of the Standards for Discovery and Procedure Before Trial
provides that: "The prosecuting attorney shall disclose to defense coun-
sel any material or information within his possession or control which
tends to negate the guilt of the accused as to the offense charged or would
tend to reduce his punishment therefore. 220 That such disclosure is re-
quired in guilty pleas and not just at trials is strongly suggested, but not
made explicit. 221
The American Law Institute's model provides specifically for pre-
plea disclosure by requiring that prior to any plea agreement "the prose-
cutor shall disclose to the defendant sufficient information within his
knowledge to enable the defendant to make an informed assessment of
the likely outcome upon a trial of the case."'222 Although not as explic-
itly directed at Brady material as the NAC model, this formulation
would certainly encompass Brady material since by definition Brady ma-
terial is highly outcome determinative. However, Brady is not men-
tioned in either the official text or the commentaries. Nor is any
accuracy rationale used to justify this provision. Rather, the rationale is
based on the value of having the defendant make a fully informed deci-
sion in the choice between plea and trial.
As the above brief review of statutory treatments of disclosure indi-
cates, none of the statutory formulations examined have utilized the ac-
curacy implications of Brady disclosure. Acceptance of those
implications as argued in section II of this Article would lead to a
number of statutory revisions. First, the Federal Rules and state codes
218. Id. at 57.
219. ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to the Adminis-
tration of Criminal Justice (1974).
220. Id. at 256.
221. Section 2.2(a) states that the material referred to in the previous section should be
turned over "as soon as practicable following the filing of charges against the accused." Id.
As part of its general principles, one of the needs pretrial procedures should serve is "to pro-
vide the accused sufficient information to make an informed plea." Section 1.1(a)(ii). Id. at
253. Again as a general principle, the ABA Standards provide that "in order to provide ade-
quate information for informed pleas," discovery should be "as full and free as possible." Sec-
tion 1.2. Id. at 253-54. The commentary to the ABA Standards does not make explicit the
desire to include Brady material as part of a pre-plea disclosure.
222. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT P. § 320.3(1)
(1975).
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 40
DISCLOSURE IN THE GUILTY PLEA PROCESS
modeled on them should recognize explicitly a statutory right to Brady
disclosure and include an accuracy rationale in their justifications. The
ALI and ABA models should clarify their recognition of a right to Brady
disclosure in the guilty plea process, as well as utilize an accuracy ration-
ale. Finally, the NAC rules should recognize an accuracy rationale in
their justification for explicit inclusion of Brady disclosure among a de-
fendant's bargaining rights.
Conclusion
Two major concerns pervade the extensive literature the institution
of plea bargaining has generated. The first is discovering and describing
how plea negotiation works, a task that has engendered numerous empir-
ical studies and, more recently, attempts to understand the process
through modeling. The second concern is the task of evaluating what
these studies and models tell us. This second task has engendered a con-
tinuing debate over the propriety of plea bargaining, a debate that has
revealed more than simple differences in opinion on the rightness or
wrongness of plea bargaining. What has also been revealed is a wide
array of norms, often conflicting, regarding the standards by which plea
bargaining, its rightness or wrongness, should be judged. Both the case
law and the secondary literature show that various values compete for
recognition in discussions of plea bargaining. Efficiency, administrative
necessity, fairness, concern for the dignity of criminal defendants and
their constitutional rights, and concern for unchecked executive discre-
tion are just some of the values that, along with accuracy, have appeared
prominently in the debate over plea bargaining.
This Article has focused on the accuracy implications of disclosure.
It has demonstrated that disclosure of Brady material-whether by con-
stitutional rule, ethical rule, or statute-has an important role to play in
advancing the accuracy of guilty pleas and that as long as we value the
accuracy of guilty pleas we should insist on such disclosure. Limitation
of the focus of this Article to the accuracy implications of disclosure in
the guilty plea process is not intended to foreclose discussion of other
rationales or values disclosure might advance. Rather, this Article seeks
to provide a foundation upon which other rationales may build, a start-
ing point rather than a termination point in the discussion of disclosure
in plea negotiations.
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